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THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Supreme Court 

In the Matter of Charles Lee Anderson, Respondent. 
Appellate Case No. 2016-001473 
Opinion No. 27668 
Submitted September 13, 2016 – Filed September 28, 2016 
DEFINITE SUSPENSION 
Lesley M. Coggiola, Disciplinary Counsel, and C. Tex 
Davis, Jr., Senior Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, both of 
Columbia, for Office of Disciplinary Counsel. 
Charles Lee Anderson, of Anderson, pro se. 
PER CURIAM: In this attorney disciplinary matter, respondent and the Office 
of Disciplinary Counsel (ODC) have entered into an Agreement for Discipline by 
Consent (Agreement) pursuant to Rule 21 of the Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary 
Enforcement contained in Rule 413 of the South Carolina Appellate Court Rules.  
In the Agreement, respondent admits misconduct and consents to a definite 
suspension, not to exceed three years, or disbarment.  Respondent requests the 
sanction be made retroactive to the date of interim suspension,1 but understands 
that if the Court declines to apply the sanction retroactively, the validity or 
enforceability of the Agreement is not affected.  ODC does not oppose the request.  
As a condition of discipline, respondent agrees to complete the Legal Ethics and 
Practice Program Ethics School, Trust Account School, and Advertising School 
prior to reinstatement.  We accept the Agreement and suspend respondent from the 
1 Respondent was placed on interim suspension by order dated January 14, 2014.  In re
Anderson, 406 S.C. 641, 753 S.E.2d 532 (2014). 
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practice of law in this state for two years, retroactive to the date of his interim
suspension. The facts, as set forth in the Agreement, are as follows. 
Facts 
Matter A 
In January 2014, respondent pled guilty to making false statements in a matter 
within the jurisdiction of a department or agency of the United States, in violation 
of 18 U.S.C. § 1001. Respondent made one or more false, fictitious and fraudulent 
statements and representations in an ongoing investigation by agents of the Drug 
Enforcement Agency and Homeland Security of a large-scale cocaine conspiracy 
that led to federal charges against multiple individuals, including a client of 
respondent. On June 23, 2014, respondent was sentenced to five months' 
imprisonment, and upon release, will be on supervised release for three years, be 
placed on a location monitoring program with radio frequency electronic 
monitoring for five months, and be required to perform 100 hours of community 
service or complete a week long community service project. 
Respondent admits his conduct violated the following Rules of Professional  
Conduct, Rule 407, SCACR: Rule 1.2(d)(a lawyer shall not counsel a client to 
engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or 
fraudulent); Rule 8.4(a)(it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to violate the 
Rules of Professional Conduct); Rule 8.4(b)(it is professional misconduct for a 
lawyer to commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, 
trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects); Rule 8.4(c)(it is 
professional misconduct for a lawyer to commit a criminal act involving moral 
turpitude); Rule 8.4(d)(it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to engage in 
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation); and Rule 
8.4(e)(it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to engage in conduct that is 
prejudicial to the administration of justice). 
Matter B 
Respondent represented a client (Client A) in a personal injury matter.  He also 
represented the client's mother (Client B) in her capacity as personal representative 
of the estate of Client A's father.  Client A signed a contingency agreement, while 
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Client B paid a flat fee for representation.  Respondent settled the liability portion 
of the personal injury matter for $25,000, which was the full amount of the policy 
involved, and the underinsured claim was settled for $8,000.
During the same time period, respondent reached an agreement with regard to the 
estate of Client A's father pursuant to which Client B would agree to pay $24,000 
within ninety days to satisfy the claims of two illegitimate children, thereby freeing 
up the property of the estate for Client B.  Client B was unable to obtain $24,000 
within the ninety-day time period, so Client A verbally authorized respondent to 
use the monies held in trust from the personal injury settlement to pay Client B's 
debt with the estate. The understanding among the parties was that Client B would 
then obtain an equity line mortgage on the property and use the proceeds to repay 
Client A. 
Respondent admits he should have obtained written consent from Client A before  
transferring any monies held in trust from the personal injury settlement.  He also 
admits his conduct violates the following Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 407, 
SCACR: Rule 1.2(a)(a lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the 
objectives of representation and shall consult with the client as to the means by 
which they are to be pursued; a lawyer may take such action on behalf of the client 
as is impliedly authorized to carry out the representation); Rule 1.15 (requirements 
for safekeeping client property); and Rule 8.4(e), supra. 
Respondent further admits the conduct constitutes grounds for discipline under Rule 
7(a)(1), (4), and (5), RLDE.2 
Conclusion 
We hereby suspend respondent from the practice of law in this state for two years, 
retroactive to the date of his interim suspension.  Respondent shall complete the 
Legal Ethics and Practice Program Ethics School, Trust Account School, and 
Advertising School prior to reinstatement. 
2 These provisions state it is a ground for discipline for a lawyer to violate the Rules of 
Professional Conduct, be convicted of a crime or moral turpitude or a serious crime, and to 
engage in conduct tending to pollute the administration of justice or to bring the courts or the 
legal profession into disrepute or conduct demonstrating an unfitness to practice law.
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Within fifteen days of the date of this opinion, respondent shall file an affidavit 
with the Clerk of Court showing that he has complied with Rule 30 of Rule 413, 
SCACR. 
DEFINITE SUSPENSION. 
PLEICONES, C.J., BEATTY, KITTREDGE, HEARN and FEW, JJ., concur.
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THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Supreme Court 

In the Matter of William Isaac Diggs, Respondent. 
Appellate Case No. 2016-001316 
Opinion No. 27669 
Submitted September 8, 2016 – Filed September 28, 2016 
DISBARRED 
Lesley M. Coggiola, Disciplinary Counsel, and Julie K. 
Martino, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, both of 
Columbia, for Office of Disciplinary Counsel.   
William Isaac Diggs, of Myrtle Beach, pro se. 
PER CURIAM:  On June 9, 2016, respondent was disbarred from the North 
Carolina State Bar.  See Attached Opinion.  Respondent failed to inform the Office 
of Disciplinary Counsel (ODC) of his disbarment as required by Rule 29(a) of the 
Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement (RLDE) contained in Rule 413 of the 
South Carolina Appellate Court Rules (SCACR).  After ODC notified the Court of 
respondent's disbarment, the Clerk of this Court sent a letter to ODC and 
respondent notifying them that, pursuant to Rule 29(b), RLDE, they had thirty (30) 
days in which to inform the Court of any claim as to why identical discipline 
should not be imposed.  Respondent failed to respond.  ODC filed a response 
stating that respondent should be disbarred and ordered to pay restitution to those 
clients from whom he misappropriated funds for his personal use and benefit and 
to the Lawyers' Fund for Client Protection (Lawyers' Fund) for claims it paid on 
his behalf. 
17 

  
 
   
 
 
 
In similar cases of misconduct, this Court has imposed disbarment and ordered the 
payment of restitution. In the Matter of Cutchin, 412 S.C. 144, 771 S.E.2d 845 
(2015); In the Matter of Miller, 406 S.C. 495, 753 S.E2d 242 (2014); In the 
Matter of Lafaye, 399 S.C. 12, 731 S.E.2d 282 (2012).  Accordingly, we find 
respondent's misconduct warrants both his disbarment and the payment of 
restitution. 
Within thirty (30) days of the date of this opinion, ODC and respondent shall enter 
into a restitution plan in which respondent shall agree to pay restitution to all 
clients harmed by his misconduct in this matter and to the Lawyers' Fund for 
claims paid on his behalf.    
Within fifteen (15) days of the date of this opinion, respondent shall file an 
affidavit with the Clerk of Court showing that he has complied with Rule 30 of 
Rule 413, SCACR, and shall also surrender his Certificate of Admission to the 
Practice of Law to the Clerk of Court. 
DISBARRED. 
PLEICONES, C.J., BEATTY, KITTREDGE, HEARN and FEW, JJ., concur.
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The Supreme Court of South Carolina 
Re: Expansion of Electronic Filing Pilot Program - Court of 
Common Pleas 
 
Appellate Case No. 2015-002439 
ORDER
Pursuant to the provisions of Article V, Section 4 of the South Carolina Constitution, 
 
IT IS ORDERED that the Pilot Program for the Electronic Filing (E-Filing) of 
documents in the Court of Common Pleas, which was established by Order dated 
December 1, 2015, is expanded to include Anderson County.  Effective October 18, 
2016, all filings in all common pleas cases commenced or pending in Anderson 
County must be E-Filed if the party is represented by an attorney, unless the type of 
case or the type of filing is excluded from the Pilot Program.  The counties currently 
designated for mandatory E-Filing are as follows:   
 
Clarendon  Lee  Greenville 
Sumter  Williamsburg  Pickens 
Spartanburg   Cherokee  
Anderson—Effective October 13, 2016 
 
Attorneys should refer to the South Carolina Electronic Filing Policies and 
Guidelines, which were adopted by the Supreme Court on October 28, 2015, and the 
training materials available at http://www.sccourts.org/efiling/ to determine whether 
any specific filings are exempted from the requirement that they be E-Filed.  
Attorneys who have cases pending in Pilot Counties are strongly encouraged to 
review, and to instruct their staff to review, the training materials available on the E-
Filing Portal. 
s/Costa M. Pleicones   
Costa M. Pleicones 
Chief Justice of South Carolina 
Columbia, South Carolina 
September 28, 2016 
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The Supreme Court of South Carolina 
Amendment to Rule 31(g) and (h) of the Rules for 
Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement, Rule 413, SCACR  
 
Appellate Case No. 2015-001286 
ORDER 
Pursuant to Article V, § 4, of the South Carolina Constitution, Rule 31(g) and (h) 
of the Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement (RLDE) contained in Rule 413 
of the South Carolina Appellate Court Rules (SCACR) are amended to read as 
follows:  
(g) Termination of Receivership. When the provisions of (d) above and the 
order of receivership have been complied with, the receiver shall apply to 
the Supreme Court for termination of the receivership. The application shall 
contain the written releases of clients to whom files and other property were 
returned, information regarding the efforts made to contact the lawyer's 
remaining clients, an inventory of the files and other property remaining in 
the receiver's possession, an itemized account of the expenses incurred in 
carrying out the order of receivership, and documentation of time spent by 
the receiver and the receiver's staff in carrying out the order of receivership.  
The Supreme Court may order the lawyer to reimburse the receiver for 
expenses incurred and time spent in carrying out the order of receivership. 
Expenses and fees for the receiver and the receiver's staff time which are 
approved and awarded by the Supreme Court shall be paid from funds 
remaining in the lawyer's accounts.  If either no such funds exist or the 
remaining funds are insufficient, the Supreme Court may direct that payment 
be made from the Lawyers' Fund for Client Protection.  If the receiver's 
expenses or fees are paid by the Lawyers' Fund for Client Protection, the 
Supreme Court may order the lawyer to reimburse that Fund. 
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 (h) Appointment of Attorneys to Assist the Receiver.  Upon petition of 
the receiver, the Supreme Court may appoint members of the South Carolina 
Bar as needed to assist the receiver in performing duties under this rule.  
With the exception of reasonable and necessary expenses, such as postage, 
telephone bills, copies, supplies and the cost of publishing legal notice in the 
newspaper, an appointed attorney shall serve without compensation as a 
service to the legal profession.  However, the Supreme Court may order that 
the appointed attorney be reimbursed a reasonable amount for other 
expenses, such as the appointed attorney's time or the time of support staff, 
when it determines that extraordinary time and services were necessary for 
the completion of the required duties or when the appointment has worked a 
substantial hardship on the appointed attorney's practice. The Supreme Court 
shall determine the reasonableness of necessary expenses and other 
expenses. Expenses which are approved and awarded by the Supreme Court 
shall be paid from funds remaining in the lawyer's accounts. If either no 
such funds exist or the remaining funds are insufficient, the Supreme Court 
may direct that payment be made from the Lawyers' Fund for Client 
Protection.  If the appointed attorney's expenses are paid by the Lawyers' 
Fund for Client Protection, the Supreme Court may order the lawyer to 
reimburse that Fund.   
This amendment is effective immediately. 
s/ Costa M. Pleicones  C.J. 
 
s/ Donald W. Beatty  J. 
 
s/ John W. Kittredge  J. 
 
s/ Kaye G. Hearn  J. 
 
s/ John Cannon Few  J. 
 
 
Columbia, South Carolina 
September 28, 2016 
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THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Court of Appeals 

One Belle Hall Property Owners Association, Inc. and 
Brandy Ramey, individually, and on behalf of all others 
similarly situated, Respondents, 
 
v. 
 
Trammell Crow Residential Company; TCR NC 
Construction I, LP; Belle Hall Direct 101, LP; TCR RLD 
Condominiums, Inc.; CS 101 Belle Hall, LP; TCR 
Southeast, Inc.; TCR Carolina Properties, Inc.; TCR SE 
Construction, Inc.; TCR SE Construction II, Inc.; TCR 
Construction, a division of Trammell Crow Residential; 
TCR Development, a division of Trammell Crow 
Residential; Trammell Crow Residential Carolina, a 
division of Trammell Crow Residential; and Tauer 
Consulting Company, Inc., a division of Trammell Crow 
Residential, each individually and collectively d/b/a 
"Trammell Crow Residential," "Trammell Crow" or 
"TCR"; Halter Properties, LLC; Halter Realty, LLC; and 
Halter Realty Group, LLC, each individually, and 
collectively d/b/a/ "Halter Companies"; Jane Doe 1-5; 
ABG Caulking & Waterproofing of Morristown, Inc. 
a/k/a ABG Caulking Contractors; Advanced Building 
Products & Services, LLC; BASF Corporation; Budget 
Mechanical Plumbing, Inc.; Builders First Source-
Southeast Group, LLC; Builders Services Group, Inc., 
individually, and d/b/a Gale Contractor Services, Inc.; 
Century Fire Protection, LLC; Cline Design Association, 
P.A. and Gary D. Cline; Coastal Lumber & Framing, 
LLC; Dodson Brothers Exterminating Co., Inc. a/k/a 
Dodson Pest Control; First Exteriors, LLC; Flooring 
Services, Inc.; General Heating & Air Conditioning 
Company of Greenville, Inc. d/b/a General Heating and 
Air; Jimmy Warner, individually, and d/b/a Warner 
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Heating & Air; Glazing Consultants, Inc.; GWC Roofing, 
Inc., individually, and d/b/a Southcoast Exteriors, Inc.; 
Houston Stafford Electrical Contractors, LP a/k/a IES 
Residential, Inc. d/b/a Houston Stafford Electric; KMAC 
of the Carolinas, Inc.; P&P Metal Sales Co., Inc. a/k/a 
P&P Metal Sales, LLC a/k/a P&P Metal Sales, Inc. a/k/a 
Carolina Metals; Pleasant Places, Inc.; Raymond 
Building Supply Corporation d/b/a Energy Saving 
Products of Florida, Inc. a/k/a Energy Saving Products of 
Florida; RS Custom Homes, LLC; Southern Specialties, 
Inc.; Structural Contractors South, Inc.; Superior 
Construction Services, Inc., individually, and d/b/a 
Superior Masonry Unlimited, Inc.; TAMKO Building 
Products, Inc. f/k/a TAMKO Roofing Products, Inc.; 
VNS Corporation, individually, and d/b/a Wholesale 
Building Products f/k/a Wholesale Building Materials, 
Inc.; What Don't We Do; and John Doe 1-25, 
Defendants, 
 
Of whom TAMKO Building Products, Inc., is the 
Appellant. 
 
VNS Corp., individually, and d/b/a Wholesale Building 
Products f/k/a Wholesale Building Materials, Inc., Third-
Party Plaintiff, 
 
v. 
 
Billy Grady d/b/a United Builders, LLC, Third-Party 
Defendant, 
 
Houston Stafford Electrical Contractors, LP a/k/a IES 
Residential, Inc. d/b/a Houston Stafford Electric, Third-
Party Plaintiff, 
 
v. 
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J. Correa Electrical Company, LLC, Third-Party 
Defendant. 
 
Appellate Case No. 2014-002115 
Appeal From Charleston County 
J.C. Nicholson, Jr., Circuit Court Judge 
Opinion No. 5407 

Heard May 4, 2016 – Filed June 1, 2016 

Withdrawn, Substituted and Refiled September 28, 2016 

REVERSED 
Richard Hood Willis, Paula Miles Burlison, and Angela 
Gilbert Strickland, all of Bowman & Brooke, LLP, of 
Columbia, for Appellant. 
Justin O'Toole Lucey and Dabny Lynn, both of Justin 
O'Toole Lucey, P.A., of Mount Pleasant, for 
Respondents. 
WILLIAMS, J.:  In this civil matter, Tamko Building Products, Inc. (Tamko) 
appeals the circuit court's denial of its motion to dismiss One Belle Hall Property 
Owners Association, Inc. (the Association) and Brandy Ramey's (collectively 
"Respondents") claims and compel them to arbitration.  Tamko argues the court 
erred in finding the arbitration agreement located in its limited warranty was
unconscionable and unenforceable. We reverse. 
FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
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This appeal arises from a dispute over the construction of One Belle Hall (OBH), 
an upscale condominium community in Mount Pleasant, South Carolina.  The 
Association is responsible for the management and administration of the OBH 
community as well as the investigation, maintenance, and repair of its common 
elements. Headquartered in Joplin, Missouri, Tamko manufactures and sells 
residential and commercial roof shingles nationally and internationally. 
During the construction of OBH, and prior to the transfer of ownership from its 
developers to the Association, a roofing subcontractor installed Tamko's "Elite 
Glass-Seal AR" asphalt shingles to the roofs of the condominium community's four 
buildings.  Tamko covered the installed shingles with a twenty-five-year "repair or 
replace" limited warranty (Warranty) against manufacturing defects.  At issue in 
this case is a binding arbitration provision on page five of the Warranty 
information that provided the following: 
MANDATORY BINDING ARBITRATION:  EVERY 
CLAIM, CONTROVERSY, OR DISPUTE OF ANY 
KIND WHATSOEVER INCLUDING WHETHER ANY 
PARTICULAR MATTER IS SUBJECT TO 
ARBITRATION (EACH AN "ACTION") BETWEEN 
YOU AND TAMKO (INCLUDING ANY OF 
TAMKO'S EMPLOYEES AND AGENTS) RELATING 
TO OR ARISING OUT OF THE SHINGLES OR THIS 
LIMITED WARRANTY SHALL BE RESOLVED BY 
FINAL AND BINDING ARBITRATION, 
REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THE ACTION 
SOUNDS IN WARRANTY, CONTRACT, STATUTE 
OR ANY OTHER LEGAL OR EQUITABLE THEORY. 
TO ARBITRATE AN ACTION AGAINST TAMKO, 
YOU MUST INITIATE THE ARBITRATION IN 
ACCORDANCE WITH THE APPLICABLE RULES 
OF ARBITRATION OF THE AMERICAN 
ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION (WHICH ARE 
AVAILABLE ONLINE AT www.adr.com OR BY 
CALLING THE AMERICAN ARBITRATION 
ASSOCIATION AT 1-800-778-7879) AND PROVIDE 
WRITTEN NOTICE TO TAMKO BY CERTIFIED 
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MAIL AT P.O. BOX 1404, JOPLIN, MISSOURI 64802 
WITHIN THE TIME PERIOD PRESCRIBED 
IMMEDIATELY BELOW. 
Legal Remedies: EXCEPT WHERE PROHIBITED 
BY LAW, THE OBLIGATION CONTAINED IN 
THIS LIMITED WARRANTY IS EXPRESSLY IN 
LIEU OF ANY OTHER OBLIGATIONS, 
GUARANTIES, WARRANTIES, AND 
CONDITIONS EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED, 
INCLUDING ANY IMPLIED WARRANTY OR 
CONDITION OF MERCHANTABILITY OR 
FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, AND 
OF ANY OTHER OBLIGATIONS OR LIABILITY 
ON THE PART OF TAMKO BUILDING 
PRODUCTS, INC. IN NO EVENT SHALL TAMKO 
BE LIABLE FOR CONSEQUENTIAL OR 
INCIDENTAL DAMAGES OF ANY KIND. SOME
STATES DO NOT ALLOW EXCLUSION OR 
LIMITATION OF IMPLIED WARRANTIES OR 
INCIDENTAL OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES, 
SO THE ABOVE LIMITATIONS OR EXCLUSIONS 
MAY NOT APPLY TO YOU. NO ACTION FOR 
BREACH OF THIS LIMITED WARRANTY OR ANY 
OTHER ACTION AGAINST TAMKO RELATING TO 
OR ARISING OUT OF THE SHINGLES, THEIR
PURCHASE OR THIS TRANSACTION SHALL BE 
BROUGHT LATER THAN ONE YEAR AFTER ANY 
CAUSE OF ACTION HAS ACCRUED.  IN 
JURISDICTIONS WHERE STATUTORY CLAIMS OR 
IMPLIED WARRANTIES AND CONDITIONS 
CANNOT BE EXCLUDED, ALL SUCH STATUTORY 
CLAIMS, IMPLIED WARRANTIES AND 
CONDITIONS AND ALL RIGHTS TO BRING 
ACTIONS FOR BREACH THEREOF EXPIRE ONE 
YEAR (OR SUCH LONGER PERIOD OF TIME IF 
MANDATED BY APPLICABLE LAWS) AFTER THE 
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DATE OF PURCHASE.  SOME STATES AND 
PROVINCES DO NOT ALLOW LIMITATIONS ON 
HOW LONG AN IMPLIED WARRANTY OR 
CONDITION LASTS, SO THE ABOVE LIMITATION 
MAY NOT APPLY TO YOU. THIS LIMITED 
WARRANTY GIVES YOU SPECIFIC LEGAL 
RIGHTS AND YOU MAY ALSO HAVE OTHER 
RIGHTS WHICH VARY FROM STATE TO STATE 
AND PROVINCE TO PROVINCE.  Invalidity or 
unenforceability of any provision herein shall not affect 
the validity or enforceability of any other provision 
which shall remain in full force and effect. 
ANY ACTION BROUGHT BY YOU AGAINST 
TAMKO WILL BE ARBITRATED (OR, IF 
ARBITRATION OF THE ACTION IS NOT 
PERMITTED BY LAW, LITIGATED) 
INDIVIDUALLY AND YOU WILL NOT 
CONSOLIDATE, OR SEEK CLASS TREATMENT 
FOR, ANY ACTION UNLESS PREVIOUSLY 
AGREED TO IN WRITING BY BOTH TAMKO AND 
YOU. 
NO REPRESENTATIVE, EMPLOYEE OR OTHER 
AGENT OF TAMKO, OR ANY PERSON OTHER 
THAN TAMKO'S PRESIDENT, HAS AUTHORITY 
TO ASSUME FOR TAMKO ANY ADDITIONAL 
LIABILITY OR RESPONSIBILITY IN CONNECTION 
WITH THE SHINGLES EXCEPT AS DESCRIBED 
ABOVE. 
At some point following OBH's completion, Respondents assert the community's 
buildings were affected by moisture damage, water intrusion, and termite damage, 
all resulting from various alleged construction deficiencies.  In February 2010, a 
developer of OBH contacted Tamko to report a warranty claim on the roof 
shingles, contending they were blistering and defective.  As part of its standard 
warranty procedure, Tamko sent the developer a "warranty kit," requiring the 
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claimant to provide proof of purchase, samples of the allegedly defective shingles, 
and photographs. The developer failed to return the warranty kit within 120 days 
and, therefore, Tamko inactivated the warranty plan.   
On November 19, 2012, Respondents filed a proposed class action lawsuit on 
behalf of all owners of condominium units at OBH, alleging defective construction 
against the community's various developers.  Respondents amended their 
complaint on December 30, 2013, to bring, inter alia, causes of action for 
negligence, breach of warranty, and strict liability against numerous contractors 
and commercial entities, including Tamko for its allegedly defective roof shingles.  
Tamko filed a motion to dismiss and compel arbitration on February 28, 2014, 
arguing Respondents were bound by the arbitration clause provided in the 
Warranty for its roof shingles.  Respondents filed a memorandum in opposition to 
Tamko's motion, contending neither the Association nor the property owners ever 
agreed to arbitrate, and the arbitration clause was unconscionable and 
unenforceable. 
After holding a hearing on the matter, the circuit court denied Tamko's motion to 
compel arbitration on September 17, 2014.  In its order, the court ruled that South 
Carolina law invalidated several of the Warranty's provisions, including the 
arbitration agreement.  Specifically, the court noted that the sale of Tamko's 
shingles was based upon an adhesion contract, and Respondents lacked any 
meaningful choice in negotiating warranty and arbitration terms.  Relying heavily 
upon two prior cases addressing the subject,1 the court held the arbitration 
agreement was unconscionable and unenforceable due to the cumulative effect of 
several oppressive and one-sided terms in the Warranty.  Last, the court found it 
could not uphold the arbitration agreement because it was not severable from the 
Warranty's unlawful terms.  This appeal followed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
"The question of the arbitrability of a claim is an issue for judicial determination, 
unless the parties provide otherwise." Zabinski v. Bright Acres Assocs., 346 S.C. 
1 See Simpson v. MSA of Myrtle Beach, Inc., 373 S.C. 14, 644 S.E.2d 663 (2007); 
Smith v. D.R. Horton, Inc., 403 S.C. 10, 742 S.E.2d 37 (Ct. App. 2013), aff'd, Op. 
No. 27645 (S.C. Sup. Ct. filed July 6, 2016) (Shearouse Adv. Sh. No. 27 at 12). 
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580, 596, 553 S.E.2d 110, 118 (2001).  This court reviews an arbitrability 
determination de novo.  Hall v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC, 413 S.C. 267, 271, 776 
S.E.2d 91, 94 (Ct. App. 2015). "Nevertheless, a circuit court's factual findings will 
not be reversed on appeal if any evidence reasonably supports the findings."  
Simpson, 373 S.C. at 22, 644 S.E.2d at 667.  
LAW/ANALYSIS  
Tamko argues the circuit court erred in finding the arbitration provision located in 
the Warranty was unconscionable and unenforceable.  We agree. 
"The policy of the United States and South Carolina is to favor arbitration of 
disputes." Zabinski, 346 S.C. at 596, 553 S.E.2d at 118.  Unless the parties have 
contracted otherwise, the Federal Arbitration Act2 (FAA) applies in federal or state 
court to any arbitration agreement involving interstate commerce.3 Munoz v. 
Green Tree Fin. Corp., 343 S.C. 531, 538, 542 S.E.2d 360, 363 (2001).  The FAA 
provides that a written arbitration provision in a contract involving interstate 
commerce "shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as 
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract."  9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).  
"Under the FAA, an arbitration clause is separable from the contract in which it is 
embedded and the issue of its validity is distinct from the substantive validity of 
the contract as a whole." Munoz, 343 S.C. at 540, 542 S.E.2d at 364 (citing Prima 
Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967)). 
"General contract principles of state law apply to arbitration clauses governed by 
the FAA." Id. at 539, 542 S.E.2d at 364. Thus, courts may invalidate arbitration 
agreements on general state law "contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, and 
unconscionability." Zabinski, 346 S.C. at 593, 553 S.E.2d at 116.   
2 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2012). 
3 Tamko is headquartered in Joplin, Missouri, and has several manufacturing 
facilities across the country, none of which are located in South Carolina. 
Therefore, because the subject shingles were sold in interstate commerce, the 
circuit court properly determined the FAA applies in this matter. 
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"In South Carolina, unconscionability is defined as the absence of meaningful 
choice on the part of one party due to one-sided contract provisions, together with 
terms that are so oppressive that no reasonable person would make them and no 
fair and honest person would accept them." Simpson, 373 S.C. at 24–25, 644 
S.E.2d at 668. "In analyzing claims of unconscionability of arbitration agreements, 
the [U.S. Court of Appeals for the] Fourth Circuit has instructed courts to focus 
generally on whether the arbitration clause is geared towards achieving an 
unbiased decision by a neutral decision-maker." Id. at 25, 644 S.E.2d at 668 
(citing Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 938 (4th Cir. 1999)).  
In Simpson, our supreme court held an arbitration clause in a vehicle trade-in 
contract between an automobile dealership and customer was unconscionable and 
unenforceable. 373 S.C. at 34, 644 S.E.2d at 674.  In upholding the denial of the 
dealer's motion to compel arbitration, the court first found the customer had no 
meaningful choice in agreeing to arbitrate.  Id. at 25–28, 644 S.E.2d at 699–70.  
The court noted the trade-in agreement was an adhesion, or "take-it-or-leave-it," 
contract that it viewed with "considerable skepticism" because automobiles are 
necessities in modern society.  Id. at 26–27, 644 S.E.2d at 669–70. According to 
the court, the customer lacked business judgment to fully understand the 
ramifications of agreeing to arbitrate, had no attorney present to assist her, and was 
"hastily" presented with the contract by the dealer for her signature.  Id. at 27, 644 
S.E.2d at 670. 
Further, the Simpson court found the arbitration clause's limitation on statutory 
remedies was oppressive and one-sided. Id. at 28–30, 644 S.E.2d at 670–71.  The 
court pointed out that the clause prohibited an arbitrator from awarding statutorily 
required double and treble damages for violations of the South Carolina Unfair 
Trade Practices Act4 and the South Carolina Regulation of Manufacturers, 
Distributors, and Dealers Act.5 Id. at 28–29, 644 S.E.2d at 670–71. Specifically, 
the court explained the provision was unconscionable because its unconditional 
requirement that the customer waive statutory remedies ran contrary to the statutes' 
very purpose in punishing acts that adversely affect the public interest.  Id. at 30, 
4 S.C. Code Ann. §§ 39-5-10 through -560 (1985 & Supp. 2015).  
5 S.C. Code Ann. §§ 56-15-10 through -600 (2006 & Supp. 2015).  
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644 S.E.2d at 671. The court also found a provision in the arbitration clause that 
allowed the dealer's judicial remedies to supersede the customer's arbitral remedies 
was unconscionable because it failed to promote a neutral and unbiased arbitral 
forum.  Id. at 30–32, 644 S.E.2d at 671–72. While the provision forced the 
customer to submit all of her claims to arbitration, it preserved the dealer's right to 
bring judicial proceedings against the customer for various causes of action that 
would not be stayed pending the outcome of arbitration.  Id. at 30, 644 S.E.2d at 
672. 
Based upon the cumulative effect of the foregoing oppressive and one-sided 
provisions contained within the entire clause, the Simpson court held the arbitration 
clause was unconscionable and unenforceable.  Id. at 34, 644 S.E.2d at 674. Last, 
the court ruled it could not sever the offensive provisions to save the arbitration 
clause because only a disintegrated fragment of the agreement would remain.  Id.
at 34–35, 644 S.E.2d at 673–74. Notwithstanding its finding that the dealer's 
arbitration clause was unconscionable, the court stressed "the importance of a case-
by-case analysis . . . to address the unique circumstances inherent in the various 
types of consumer transactions."  Id. at 36, 644 S.E.2d at 674. 
Following Simpson, this court later held an arbitration agreement embedded in a 
home sales contract was unconscionable and unenforceable.  D.R. Horton, 403 
S.C. at 14–15, 742 S.E.2d at 40–41. In D.R. Horton, the buyers purchased a house 
from a corporate homebuilder, which included an arbitration clause in its home 
purchase agreement. Id. at 12, 742 S.E.2d at 39. Paragraph 14 of the purchase 
agreement was titled "Warranties and Dispute Resolution," and it contained 
subparagraphs 14(a) through 14(j) addressing the obligations of the parties prior to 
and immediately following closing.  Id. at 12–13, 742 S.E.2d at 39. While 
subparagraph 14(g) addressed arbitration between the parties, the homebuilder 
disclaimed various warranties in subparagraph 14(c) as well as liability for 
"monetary damages of any kind, including secondary, consequential, punitive, 
general, special[,] or indirect damages" in subparagraph 14(i). Id. 
In upholding the circuit court's denial of the homebuilder's motion to compel 
arbitration, this court held the arbitration agreement was unconscionable, 
particularly in light of subparagraph 14(i) which exempted the homebuilder from
all monetary damages.  Id. at 15, 742 S.E.2d at 40–41. Furthermore, the court 
found it should not sever the arbitration provision from the unconscionable 
43 

  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                        
 
 
 
provisions located in paragraph 14, again highlighting the homebuilder's attempt to 
waive its liability for the purchasers' damages.  Id. at 16–17, 742 S.E.2d at 41. 
After granting the homebuilder's petition for a writ of certiorari, our supreme court 
affirmed this court's decision.  Smith v. D.R. Horton, Inc., Op. No. 27645 (S.C. 
Sup. Ct. filed July 6, 2016) (Shearouse Adv. Sh. No. 27 at 19).  The supreme court 
dismissed the homebuilder's assertion that the lower courts violated the Prima 
Paint6 doctrine in looking beyond the express arbitration clause located in 
subparagraph 14(g) in their analysis of unconscionability because the various 
subparagraphs addressed important warranty information and contained numerous 
cross-references to each other.  Id. at 16–17. In construing the entirety of 
paragraph 14 as the arbitration agreement, the court held the buyers lacked any 
meaningful choice to arbitrate and the homebuilder's attempts to disclaim implied 
warranties and liability for all monetary damages were oppressive.  Id. at 17–18. 
Last, because the agreement did not contain a severability clause, the court found 
the parties did not intend for a court to sever any unconscionable terms from the 
arbitration agreement.  Id. at 18 n.6. 
Turning to the instant case, we first acknowledge, and Tamko concedes, the 
Warranty is an adhesion contract based upon the sale of mass-produced goods.  
Consequently, we find the circuit court properly determined Respondents lacked 
any meaningful choice to arbitrate.  However, our supreme court has made clear 
that adhesion contracts are not per se unconscionable.  See Simpson, 373 S.C. at 
27, 644 S.E.2d at 669; see also id. at 36, 644 S.E.2d at 674 (recognizing "the 
importance of a case-by-case analysis . . . to address the unique circumstances 
inherent in the various types of consumer transactions").  Therefore, we turn to the 
second prong of the unconscionability analysis to determine whether no reasonable 
person would make or accept any oppressive or one-sided terms within the 
arbitration agreement.  See Simpson, 373 S.C. at 24–25, 644 S.E.2d at 668 (stating 
that an unconscionability analysis has two prongs).   
6 In Prima Paint, the United States Supreme Court ruled that an arbitration 
agreement is separable from the contract in which it is embedded and the issue of 
its validity is distinct from the substantive validity of the contract as a whole.  See 
388 U.S. at 406.
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Upon our review of the arbitration agreement, we hold the circuit court erred in 
finding the purportedly unenforceable disclaimers and limitations within the "Legal 
Remedies" paragraph contributed to the unconscionability of the arbitration 
agreement. Specifically, we recognize that Tamko continuously used language to 
the effect that any attempted disclaimer or limitation did not apply to purchasers in 
jurisdictions that disallowed them.  Moreover, unlike the arbitration agreement in 
D.R. Horton, the legal remedies paragraph contains a severability clause. 
Therefore, even considering the terms Respondents find objectionable, we are 
unable to conclude these terms are oppressive because they would not apply in the 
underlying dispute if the arbitrator found they violated South Carolina law.7 
Next, we hold the circuit court erred in finding the arbitration agreement was not 
separable from other allegedly unconscionable provisions that precede the 
arbitration agreement on page five.  See Munoz, 343 S.C. at 540, 542 S.E.2d at 364 
(providing that, under the FAA, "an arbitration clause is separable from the 
contract in which it is embedded and the issue of its validity is distinct from the 
substantive validity of the contract as a whole").  On page four of the Warranty, 
Tamko included provisions that limited the transferability of the Warranty and 
excluded its liability for any damage to buildings resulting from defective shingles.  
In addition to being unconscionable, Respondents contend these provisions address 
Tamko's potential liability and must be read together with the arbitration agreement 
on the following page.  We find, however, that such a construction of the contract 
violates the Prima Paint doctrine because these provisions are clearly outside the 
arbitration agreement.  See 388 U.S. at 406 (holding that courts may only consider 
7 In any event, we believe South Carolina's Commercial Code generally permits 
sellers of goods to include most of the limitations and exclusions found in the 
Warranty. See S.C. Code Ann. § 36-2-316(2)–(3) (2003) (allowing a seller to 
exclude or modify implied warranties); S.C. Code Ann. § 36-2-719(1)(a) (2003) 
(permitting a seller to repair or replace nonconforming goods in lieu of statutory 
remedies); § 36-2-719(3) (allowing a seller to exclude consequential damages); see 
also York v. Dodgeland of Columbia, Inc., 406 S.C. 67, 91–94, 749 S.E.2d 139, 
151–53 (Ct. App. 2013) (upholding a class action waiver in an arbitration 
agreement under the FAA). 
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the threshold question of whether the arbitration agreement is invalid, not whether 
the contract as a whole is invalid). 
Finally, we find the arbitration provision facilitates an unbiased decision by a 
neutral decisionmaker in the event of a dispute.  See Simpson, 373 S.C. at 25, 644 
S.E.2d at 668 (stating courts should generally focus on whether an arbitration 
clause is "geared towards achieving an unbiased decision by a neutral decision-
maker"). Pursuant to the arbitration agreement, the purchaser must submit "every 
claim, controversy, or dispute of any kind whatsoever" relating to Tamko's 
shingles or the Warranty to arbitration in accordance with the rules of the 
American Arbitration Association.8  The arbitration agreement does not unduly 
limit a purchaser's right to a meaningful legal proceeding.  In fact, the agreement 
even anticipates actions from purchasers that "sound[] in warranty, contract, 
statute[,] or any other legal or equitable theory." 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing analysis, we hold the circuit court erred in finding the 
cumulative effect of the Warranty's purportedly unlawful terms rendered the 
arbitration agreement unconscionable and unenforceable.  Therefore, the circuit 
court's order is 
REVERSED. 

LOCKEMY, C.J., and HUFF, J., concur. 

8 Although the arbitration agreement may appear one-sided because only the 
consumer is required to submit claims to arbitration, Tamko contends it would 
never be forced to initiate a cause of action—such as a collection dispute—against 
an end user because it receives payment for its products upon delivery to its 
various distributors. Therefore, we find any perceived lack of mutuality in this 
commercial context does not make the arbitration agreement unconscionable 
because Respondents are not deprived of a remedy.  See Simpson, 373 S.C. at 31, 
644 S.E.2d at 672 ("Our courts have held that lack of mutuality of remedy in an 
arbitration agreement, on its own, does not make the arbitration agreement 
unconscionable."); id. (stating that requiring one party to seek a remedy through 
arbitration rather than the judicial system does not deprive that party of a remedy 
altogether). 
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Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant 
Attorney General William M. Blitch, Jr., both of 
Columbia, for Respondent. 
MCDONALD, J.:  A Lexington County jury convicted David A. Land of three 
counts of sexual exploitation of a minor, second degree.  Land appeals his 
convictions, arguing the circuit court erred in denying his motion for a directed 
verdict because the State failed to provide sufficient proof from which a reasonable 
jury could conclude that he knowingly distributed or exchanged pictures or videos 
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of minors engaged in sexual acts as prohibited by section 16-15-405(A) of the 
South Carolina Code (2015). We affirm. 
FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY
South Carolina Law Enforcement Division (SLED) special investigators Britt 
Dove and Lucinda McKellar conduct online undercover operations targeting 
individuals distributing child pornography through peer-to-peer file sharing 
databases.1  Using programs utilized by the Internet Crimes Against Children Task 
Force (the Programs),2 Agents Dove and McKellar target individuals possessing 
child pornography available to be viewed on various file sharing networks, such as 
LimeWire, Phex, FrostWire, and others.3  When searching for distributors of child 
pornography, the Programs search out specific SHA (secure hash algorithm)
values—also called "hash values"—known to be associated with images of child 
pornography. Agent Dove described the process as follows: 
[The Programs] would search for hash values.  Now, 
everything on the internet can be given a hash value.  
1 All persons using such file sharing programs are considered "peers."  Officer 
Dove described peer-to-peer file sharing as follows:  "You can download free 
software that's out there.  That software will allow me to go out over the internet, 
[and] connect directly with another computer or multiple computers that are on a 
network. . . . [O]nce I connect with them, if they make files available for sharing, 
. . . [y]ou can go connect with them. . . .  At that time, you can use it on your 
computer.  You can make it available on your computer to share back out to the 
internet to other people that are on the network." 
2 Agent Dove described using Camtasia, a program that records and documents 
what he is actually viewing on his computer screen as he reviews downloaded 
files. 
3 On redirect, Agent Dove explained how a downloaded file gets placed in 
LimeWire's shared folder:  "[I]f you take the default settings, once you download 
something, it's automatically going to place it in the share folder until you either 
move it out of that folder or you delete it.  It's going to remain in that share folder 
and be available for others." 
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That's going to be basically a mathematical formula 
that’s done to everything -- it gives this independent 
number.  Almost like DNA for a person, but it's for a file.  
The only way that changes is if something inside that file 
changes. So the [Program] would go through and it
would look and see for that hash value, that DNA match 
basically. It would go through and anything it found that 
it was known that it was related to child pornography or 
contraband, it would log that this hash value was seen at 
this time, in this state, and eventually return a list that I 
could go and look at and use GEO location stuff to find 
out if it was in South Carolina, and was inside my 
jurisdiction to begin an investigation. 
. . . . 
[The hash value] was for the individual files.  It would 
. . . continuously and automatically go through the 
different softwares and look for the individual files that 
match that hash number. 
Agent Dove further explained the process for downloading suspicious files and 
then viewing the files to verify whether or not they contained child pornography.  
In downloading these files, Dove obtains the internet protocol address (IP address), 
which is similar to a phone number, associated with the location of the particular 
file.4  Dove testified that only one user can have one IP address assigned at a time, 
and the IP address provides the location of the computer being used to view or 
store the file. In addition to the IP address, Dove obtains the global unique 
identifying number (GUID) generated when the software—such as LimeWire in 
the instant case—is installed on the computer.  The GUID identifies the software 
on a particular computer or device; it will not change even if the location of the 
computer or its IP address changes.
4 According to Agent Dove, when a person logs onto a computer, the internet 
service provider assigns an IP address.  Under appropriate circumstances, agents 
can then request a subpoena or search warrant for the service provider and obtain 
the name of the person paying for the service, namely, "who the subscriber is at 
that time and date that [the] download occurred."  
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[T]he GUID . . . is the global unique identifier.  When 
you download a software, in this case LimeWire . . . to 
your system, it gives it that thirty-two character 
alphanumeric number that's unique to that software on 
that computer at that time.  It doesn't change if you move 
the computer around to different IP addresses.  It stays 
the same. Much like the VIN on a car . . . .  You can 
register a car in Tennessee or South Carolina, the VIN 
remains the same.  And that way, the system knows who 
has what available. It can use it for management 
purposes, even if the IP address changes. 
On December 7, 2009, Dove conducted an online investigation and found a 
computer with likely child pornography available for distribution.  Dove 
downloaded four files from the computer.  The title of one of the downloaded 
images contained numerous words typically associated with child pornography.  At 
this time, Dove obtained the IP address and the GUID for the computer running the 
LimeWire program from which he downloaded the four files.  After obtaining the 
necessary subpoena authorization, Dove discovered that the internet service 
provider was Time Warner Cable in Lexington, South Carolina. 
Agent McKellar conducted a separate online investigation on December 4, 2009.  
During her investigation, McKellar located a computer that shared known child 
pornography, and she was able to download several of its files.  McKellar testified 
that the information identifying the IP address, location, and GUID were the same 
for each of the files. In other words, "This [document or file] would have had to 
come from the same person, same computer, at the same location, using the same 
IP address as the previous three files."  The computer had an IP address in 
Lexington and contained images saved with terminology typically associated with 
child pornography. 
On January 27, 2010, McKellar conducted another online investigation and located 
a computer housing child pornography available for peer downloading. Like the 
files downloaded on December 4, 2009, these new files were available from the 
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user to anyone using the peer network.  Using a single-source download,5 
McKellar was able to determine the documents had the same GUID as the 
computer distributing child pornography on December 4, 2009, although the IP 
address had since changed. 
After gathering the necessary information, Dove and McKellar realized that they 
had accessed computers using IP addresses not only in the same apartment 
complex, but that the apartments were "right above each other."  When asked if she 
noticed any connection with the GUID in any other investigation, Agent McKellar 
responded, "Yes, . . . we had different IP addresses[.]  [B]ut it was the exact same 
GUID associated with my investigation on December the 9th[,]  [Agent Dove's] 
investigation on . . . December the 7th, and my investigation on January 27th of 
2010. It was the same GUID for each address."  Additionally, the investigators 
determined that the same GUID from the computer sharing the child pornography 
was previously located in Fort Campbell, Kentucky. 
Dove and McKellar then went to the Lexington apartment complex and checked 
for wireless access points.  They found five potential wireless access points, four 
secured and one unsecured.  The unsecured access point was titled "Admin."  
Because the locations were sitting right on top of each other with the same GUID, 
Dove and McKellar were concerned that there might be an issue with a wireless 
access point being "basically piggybacked" (accessed or amplified by a nearby 
unauthorized user). At this time, the investigators decided to execute their separate 
search warrants simultaneously.
Agent McKellar executed her search warrant on 101 Saluda Point at the apartment 
of a married couple, the Does.6 Mr. Doe explained that the couple did have 
wireless internet access, but their wireless access point was not password-
protected. Additionally, Mr. Doe told Agent McKellar that the name of their 
wireless access point was "Admin."  Special Agent Colin Duncan conducted an on-
site forensic review of the Does' home computer to determine "what kinds of 
5 Agent McKellar explained, "Single source means I am getting this file from one 
person using the software with that [GUID] from that IP address, . . . which is 
located in Lexington, South Carolina." 
6 As these cooperating witnesses were uninvolved in any criminal activity, they are 
unidentified for purposes of this opinion.
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programs, if LimeWire was on this computer and also if there [were] any . . . files 
that depict minors engaged in sexual activity."  McKellar testified, "There [were] 
no file sharing programs on the computer at the residence and there [were] very 
few images. And none of those images were children engaged in sexual activity."7 
Agent Dove executed his search warrant on 101 Saluda Point, Apartment 1138, 
which was the residence of Christy Land, her daughter, and her son.  Dove seized a 
laptop and two computer towers from the Land home.  These items were submitted 
for forensic examination, but the examiner did not find any items related to Dove's 
investigation. The agents learned from Ms. Land, however, that David A. Land 
(Land), her older son, might be found at his grandparents' home in Greenwood. 
On February 11, 2010, Agent McKellar executed a search warrant at the home of 
Land's grandparents.  Land's grandfather called him and asked him to return to the 
home with his laptop.  Upon Land's return, McKellar advised him of his Miranda8 
rights. After agreeing to speak with McKellar without an attorney present, Land 
admitted to being familiar with file sharing programs and discussed using 
LimeWire at various locations, including Fort Campbell, where he had been 
stationed. 
According to McKellar, Land stated he would travel every couple of weeks to visit 
his mother in Lexington, and he used her laptop while visiting.  "When [Land]
would go to the VA Hospital, he would visit [his mother] and use her laptop at her 
residence in Lexington County."  Land admitted that he would access an open 
wireless network called "Admin," which was not associated with his mother's
residence. Land further admitted to intentionally receiving child pornography after 
using specific search terms.  He acknowledged and admitted to downloading the 
three files that Agent McKellar downloaded from his computer on January 27, 
2010. Finally, he admitted that after looking at the hundreds of files of child 
pornography he downloaded while in Lexington, he performed a system restore in 
an effort to delete everything from his computer.  
7 Agent McKellar also learned that Mr. Doe had a work laptop that he brought 

home with him on occasion.  Mr. Doe brought that laptop to McKellar's office to 

check for LimeWire and any files depicting minors engaged in sexual activity.  

Again, no such software or files were present.  

8 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
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SLED agents arrested Land at his grandparents' Greenwood home on February 11, 
2010. Land was charged with three counts of second-degree sexual exploitation of 
a minor. 
On February 10, 2014, the Lexington County Grand Jury indicted Land on all three 
charges pursuant to section 16-15-405(A) of the South Carolina Code (2015).  
Land was tried by jury on November 5–8, 2014.  At the end of the State's case, 
Land moved for a directed verdict, which the circuit court denied.  Following his 
conviction on all three counts, the circuit court sentenced Land to seven years in 
prison, suspended upon the service of thirty months and two years' probation on 
each count. The circuit court further required that Land register as a sex offender.  
LAW/ANALYSIS  
"When ruling on a motion for a directed verdict, the trial court is concerned with 
the existence or nonexistence of evidence, not its weight."  State v. Weston, 367 
S.C. 279, 292, 625 S.E.2d 641, 648 (2006).  "If there is any direct evidence or any
substantial circumstantial evidence reasonably tending to prove the guilt of the 
accused, the [appellate court] must find the case was properly submitted to the 
jury." State v. Brandt, 393 S.C. 526, 542, 713 S.E.2d 591, 599 (2011) (emphasis 
added) (quoting Weston, 367 S.C. at 292–93, 625 S.E.2d at 648).  "When
reviewing a denial of a directed verdict, an appellate court views the evidence and 
all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the State."  Id. "The trial
court should grant a directed verdict when the evidence merely raises a suspicion 
that the accused is guilty." Id.  "A defendant is entitled to a directed verdict when 
the State fails to produce evidence of the offense charged."  Id.
Land argues the circuit court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict 
because the State failed to provide sufficient proof from which a reasonable jury 
could conclude that he knowingly distributed or exchanged pictures or videos of a 
minor engaged in a sexual act in violation of section 16-15-405(A).9  We disagree. 
9 In his reply brief, Land further argues, "The jury charge in this case is not an 
example of clarity so as to inform the jury as to what factors they are to consider or 
what the various terms mean."  Specifically, Land asserts the circuit court "never 
defined soliciting and the jury was left to speculate as to the meaning of the term."  
Land admits that neither the defense attorney nor the State moved for clarification.  
Thus, we believe Land failed to preserve this issue for our review.  See Wilder 
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Section 16-15-405 provides, in pertinent part: 
(A) An individual commits the offense of second degree 
sexual exploitation of a minor if, knowing the character 
or content of the material, he: 
(1) records, photographs, films, develops, 
duplicates, produces, or creates digital electronic 
file material that contains a visual representation of 
a minor engaged in sexual activity or appearing in 
a state of sexually explicit nudity when a 
reasonable person would infer the purpose is 
sexual stimulation; or 
(2) distributes, transports, exhibits, receives, sells, 
purchases, exchanges, or solicits material that 
contains a visual representation of a minor 
engaged in sexual activity or appearing in a state 
of sexually explicit nudity when a reasonable 
person would infer the purpose is sexual 
stimulation. 
(B) In a prosecution pursuant to this section, the trier of 
fact may infer that a participant in sexual activity or a 
state of sexually explicit nudity depicted in material as a 
minor through its title, text, visual representations, or 
otherwise, is a minor. 
(emphasis added). 
 
                                                                                                                             
 
 
Corp. v. Wilke, 330 S.C. 71, 76, 497 S.E.2d 731, 733 (1998) ("It is axiomatic that 
an issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, but must have been raised to 
and ruled upon by the trial judge to be preserved for appellate review."); State v. 
Sullivan, 310 S.C. 311, 314, 426 S.E.2d 766, 768 (1993) ("To preserve an issue for 
appellate review, an appellant must object at his first opportunity."); State v. 
Wakefield, 323 S.C. 189, 191, 473 S.E.2d 831, 832 (Ct. App. 1996) (to be
considered on appeal, all issues must be argued by the appellant in his initial brief).
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Land contends that the State failed to provide sufficient proof for a reasonable jury 
to conclude that he knowingly distributed or exchanged pictures or videos of a 
minor engaged in a sexual act.  He asserts that to prove he had the mens rea to 
violate section 16-15-405(A), the State had to prove Land knew that a person with 
file sharing software could access his computer and that he intended to permit such 
access. 
In support of his argument, Land cites Biller v. State, 109 So.3d 1240 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 2013), in which a Florida District Court of Appeal considered the use of 
LimeWire in conjunction with allegations of possession and "transmission" of 
child pornography. Using LimeWire, Biller downloaded pornographic images of 
children to his home computer from other LimeWire subscribers who permitted 
access to their files. Id. at 1241. Biller argued that to "'send' means a purposeful 
act to deliver the files, rather than the mere allowance of access to the files."  Id.
Because the State conceded that Biller "did not affirmatively dispatch the images 
using a function on his computer," the Florida court reversed Biller's conviction for 
transmitting child pornography.  Id. 
Significant legal and factual differences distinguish Biller from the case at hand.  
First, the Florida court's reversal of Biller's conviction for "transmission of 
pornography by electronic device" focused upon the statute's definition of 
"transmitting" and the interpretation of the word "send."  Id. at 1241. No such 
transmission requirement exists for purposes of the South Carolina statute.  Section 
16-15-405(A) requires only that the State prove that Land solicited or received or 
distributed child pornography, not that he did all three.  Moreover, in addition to 
the evidence found on his computer, Land's own statements established that he 
solicited the child pornography by using such terms as "pre-teen" and "Lolita" in 
conjunction with LimeWire to find pornographic images and videos of minors. 
Land admitted to intentionally receiving the prohibited images, including the three 
downloaded by Agent McKellar. McKellar testified that Land "was familiar with 
file sharing . . . and discussed using LimeWire as far back as his time at Fort 
Campbell when he was in the military."  She also testified that during her 
investigations on December 4, 2009 and January 7, 2010, she saw the GUID in 
connection with Fort Campbell, meaning "the person using that program was 
located in Fort Campbell at some point." Further, Land admitted to McKellar that 
he had used LimeWire for music and to download images of child pornography.  
McKellar testified: 
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Q: Did [Land] mention whether he would use 
[LimeWire] to download videos of child pornography, as 
well? 
A: Yes. At one point in time he said that he had 
downloaded six hundred files while at his mother's
house, looked at them and then deleted those files. 
Q: Okay.  Did you ask him about did he ever 
accidentally download any files? 
A: Yes. I asked him if he had ever gotten any files that 
he didn't intentionally mean to get.  And he said that all 
the files that he got were -- that he received were 
intentional. 
Q: Okay.  Did he say how often he downloaded files? 
A: Every couple of weeks when he would go to his
mother's, he would open some of the files up, look at 
them and then do a mass download. . . . 
McKellar was then presented with a printed copy of the titles on the browse list 
from her January 27, 2010 investigation, which included the three files she 
downloaded. She testified that she showed Land this list, as well as the three files,
and that he recognized them and admitted to downloading them.  
Q: Did [Land] give any information about how he would 
search for those files? 
A: [Land] underlined a couple of words and indicated 
that they were search terms by writing on that word 
["]search term.["]
Land identified the terms "pre-teen" and "Lolita," two terms which McKellar 
testified were commonly associated with child pornography. 
In State v. Tuckness, 257 S.C. 295, 299, 185 S.E.2d 607, 608 (1971), our supreme 
court examined criminal intent: 
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The question of the intent with which an act is done is 
one of fact and is ordinarily for jury determination except 
in extreme cases where there is no evidence thereon.  The 
intent with which an act is done denotes a state of mind, 
and can be proved only by expressions or conduct, 
considered in the light of the given circumstances.  State 
v. Johnson, 84 S.C. 45, 65 S.E. 1023 [1909].  Intent is 
seldom susceptible to proof by direct evidence and must 
ordinarily be proven by circumstantial evidence, that is, 
by facts and circumstances from which intent may be 
inferred. 
Thus, as the State properly argues, the issue of whether Land possessed the 
requisite intent at the time the crime was committed is typically a question for the 
jury because without an actual statement of intent by the actor, proof of intent must
be determined by inferences from conduct.  See State v. Haney, 257 S.C. 89, 91, 
184 S.E.2d 344, 345 (1971) (absent an admission by the defendant, proof of intent 
necessarily rests on inference from conduct). 
Here, as noted above, Land admitted to soliciting and downloading multiple 
pornographic files while at Fort Campbell and at his mother's home in Lexington.  
The IP addresses for the computer searched by Dove and McKellar supported this 
confession. Additionally, Land confessed to his use of particular search terms 
associated with child pornography and admitted to downloading the January 27, 
2010 files discovered during Agent McKellar's investigation.  The circuit court 
explained: 
[C]onsidering the evidence as to the GUID numbers, 
evidence as to the IP addresses, evidence as to the use of 
the unsecured Admin WiFi, it appear[s] that -- and 
again, . . . I'm not concerned with the weight of the 
evidence. I'm just concerned with the existence of the 
evidence. And I believe that there is sufficient evidence 
to send this case to the jury. 
(emphasis added).   
We agree and find that the State presented ample evidence demonstrating Land's 
knowledge and intent to commit the offenses of sexual exploitation of a minor in 
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the second degree. The evidence, including Land's own admissions, established 
that Land knew how LimeWire worked and knew that the child pornography he 
downloaded would be available for others to download and view. In fact, such file 
sharing was the purpose of the LimeWire program.  Land's knowing use of a 
program with the specific function of downloading and sharing stored files, in 
conjunction with his acknowledged use of the file-sharing program to download 
and view the images of child pornography, required that the circuit court deny his 
motion for a directed verdict. 
CONCLUSION 
Accordingly, we affirm Land's convictions for second-degree sexual exploitation 
of a minor.  
AFFIRMED. 
LOCKEMY, C.J., and WILLIAMS, J., concur. 
58 

  
 
  
 
  
  
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Court of Appeals 

Otha Delaney, Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
First Financial of Charleston, Inc., Respondent. 
 
Appellate Case No. 2014-000824 
Appeal From Charleston County 

Stephanie P. McDonald, Circuit Court Judge  

Opinion No. 5442 

Submitted March 1, 2016 – Filed September 28, 2016 

AFFIRMED 
Philip L. Fairbanks, of Beaufort, for Appellant. 
Stephen L. Brown, Russell G. Hines, and Perry M. 
Buckner, IV, all of Young Clement Rivers, of 
Charleston, for Respondent.
SHORT, J.:  Otha Delaney appeals the trial court's grant of First Financial of 
Charleston, Inc.'s motion to dismiss his class action complaint for damages and 
equitable relief under the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), alleging the court 
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erred in (1) dismissing the complaint as time-barred by applying the incorrect 
statute of limitations,1 and (2) determining the date the statute of limitations began 
to run. We affirm. 
On October 12, 2007, Delaney entered into a Retail Installment Contract (the 
Contract) to purchase a truck from Coliseum Motors.  The Contract was assigned 
to First Financial, making it a secured party under the UCC.  After Delaney failed 
to make payments, First Financial repossessed the vehicle.  On May 2, 2008, First 
Financial sent Delaney a "Notice of Private Sale of Collateral" (notice of sale) 
advising Delaney of its intention to sell the vehicle.  On December 15, 2008, First 
Financial sold the vehicle. 
On October 4, 2011, Delaney, as a putative member of a class, filed this class 
action, alleging (1) the notice of sale was insufficient under the UCC, and (2) he 
was entitled to relief under section 36-9-625 of the South Carolina Code (2003) 
(providing remedies for a secured party's failure to comply with the UCC).  
Delaney sought recovery on behalf of the class members.  
First Financial moved to dismiss, arguing Delaney's claim was barred under the 
one-year statute of limitations applicable for statutory penalties set forth in South 
Carolina Code § 15-3-570 (2005) (providing a one-year statute of limitations for 
actions based on a statute for a penalty).  Delaney filed a response to the motion to 
dismiss, arguing the claim was not a statutory penalty, but it was a remedial claim
for damages under section 36-9-625.  Delaney argued that because the claim is 
remedial, the UCC's six-year statute of limitations in section 36-2-725(1) (2003) of 
the South Carolina Code governing breaches of contract for the sale of goods 
applied. In the alternative, Delaney argued if the recovery is a penalty rather than a 
compensable remedy, the action is governed by the three-year statute of limitations 
provided in South Carolina Code section 15-3-540(2) (2005) (applying to "[a]n 
action upon a statute for a penalty or forfeiture when the action is given to the 
party aggrieved or to such party and the State, except when the statute imposing it 
prescribes a different limitation").  
1 We combine Delaney's second and third issues and address them as the first issue. 
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At a hearing on its motion to dismiss, First Financial argued the action was for a 
penalty because no contract was alleged to have been breached; there was no plea 
for compensatory damages; the complaint did not allege a tort; and the plea for 
relief consisted of the finance charge and ten percent of the principal amount under 
the Contract. According to First Financial, such a plea was governed by the one-
year statute of limitations provided for in section 15-3-570, which would be 
triggered by the "commission of the offense."  First Financial also argued 
Delaney's claim was time-barred under the three-year statute of limitations, which 
was triggered by the issuance of the notice of sale.  
Delaney argued neither the one-year nor the three-year statute of limitations 
applied, and even if the three-year statute of limitations in section 15-3-540(2) 
applied, the time had not expired at the time of the filing because the statute would 
have been triggered "not when the letter [was] received[, but] . . . only when the 
collateral was disposed of." Delaney maintained that setting minimum statutory 
damages of ten percent of the contract plus finance charges ensures compliance by 
creditors and "that[,] in and of itself doesn't turn it into a penalty because it is 
clearly a substitute for actual damages."  
In an order filed April 30, 2013, the trial court granted the motion to dismiss.  The 
court found Delaney's sole cause of action was a statutory penalty because it 
requested the finance charge and ten percent of the principal amount of the 
obligation, which is the statutorily-mandated award for a violation of the notice 
provision pursuant to section 36-9-625(c)(2).  Noting the Official Comment 4 to 
section 36-9-625(c)(2), which provides the specific relief is to be awarded 
"regardless of any injury that may have resulted[,]" the court found "this fixed 
formula is not remedial in nature but rather serves the purpose of imposing 
automatic liability for 'every noncompliance.'"  The trial court noted our supreme 
court has interpreted the same provision as a statutory penalty in several cases, and 
it further noted other courts have similarly classified the statutory award based on 
the uniform UCC model statute, upon which South Carolina based its code.  
The court next rejected Delaney's argument that section 36-2-725(1) applied, 
which provides a six-year limitations period for a breach of contract for the sale of 
goods under the UCC. The court noted Delaney did not plead breach of contract; 
thus, section 36-2-725(1) did not apply.  The court found the case concerned the 
sufficiency of notice prior to the disposition of collateral; thus, the case dealt 
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"entirely with Article 9's provisions concerning secured transactions.  Article 2's 
provisions pertaining to the sale of goods [were] wholly irrelevant."  The court also 
found general rules of statutory construction prevented the application of the six-
year limitations period.  The court found the "controlling limitations period should 
be either S.C. Code Ann. § 15-3-570 or § 15-3-540(2), respectively one or three 
years." The court noted general rules of statutory construction require a specific 
statute to prevail over a more general statute, and because Delaney's desired 
recovery was a statutory penalty, sections 15-3-570 and 15-3-540(2) spoke "more 
directly to the actual allegations in this lawsuit."  
Finally, the court found Delaney's complaint was time-barred under either section 
15-3-570 or 15-3-540(2). The court found "[w]hile either statute might be 
reasonably applied to this matter, the Court need not decide this inquiry as 
[Delaney's] cause of action accrued upon receipt of the alleged noncompliant 
Notice of Sale and either statute would therefore serve as a bar to . . . recovery."  
As to section 15-3-570,2 the statute specifically states the commission of the 
offense serves as the date of accrual.  The court found the statute began to run in 
May 2008 and expired in May 2009. 
As to section 15-3-540(2),3 the court noted the statute did not specifically delineate 
a date of accrual, and it found "the alleged commission of the offense should 
similarly serve as the commencement of the three year statute of limitations."  The 
court continued,  
Unlike an action for actual or compensatory damages, 
[Delaney's] action for a penalty focuses on a specific act 
of non-compliance . . . that awards automatic relief.  The 
right to bring the action and thus the proper date of 
2 "An action upon a statute for a penalty or forfeiture given, in whole or in part, to 
any person who will prosecute for it must be commenced within one year after the 
commission of the offense."  S.C. Code Ann. § 15-3-570 (2005). 
3 "Within three years . . . : (2) An action upon a statute for a penalty or forfeiture 
when the action is given to the party aggrieved or to such party and the State, 
except when the statute imposing it prescribes a different limitation."  S.C. Code 
Ann. § 15-3-540(2). 
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accrual should be determined by the date on which that 
alleged noncompliance occurred.  However, this date of 
accrual would also coincide with the date on which 
[Delaney] either knew or should have known that a 
violation had occurred. 
Furthermore, I find that the legislature intended 
[§§] 15-3-570 and 15-3-540 to have similar dates of 
accrual. Both govern actions for a statutory penalty and 
are nearly identical in language but for the length of the 
limitations period. Given that the legislature specifically 
enumerated the date of accrual for penalty actions under 
§ 15-3-570 to be the date of the commission of the 
offense, this Court sees no logical purpose in creating an 
alternative date of accrual for penalty actions under § 15-
3-540(2). 
The court granted First Financial's motion to dismiss.  After a hearing, the court 
denied Delaney's motion for reconsideration.  This appeal followed. 
ISSUES 
I.		 Did the trial court err in applying the statute of limitations?
II.		 Did the trial court err in finding the action accrued at the time the notice of 
sale was received rather than at the time First Financial disposed of the 
collateral? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW  
"On appeal from the dismissal of a case pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), an appellate 
court applies the same standard of review as the trial court." Rydde v. Morris, 381 
S.C. 643, 646, 675 S.E.2d 431, 433 (2009).  The appellate court is required to 
construe the complaint in a light most favorable to the nonmovant and determine if 
the facts alleged and reasonably deducible inferences in the complaint would 
entitle the plaintiff to relief on any theory of the case.  Id.  The court may sustain 
the dismissal when the facts alleged in the complaint do not support relief under 
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any theory of law. Flateau v. Harrelson, 355 S.C. 197, 202, 584 S.E.2d 413, 416 
(Ct. App. 2003). 
LAW/ANALYSIS 
I. Applicable Statutes of Limitations 
Delaney argues the trial court erred in finding the six-year statute of limitations in 
section 36-2-725 did not apply and in finding Delaney's action barred by either the 
limitations period provided by section 15-3-540(2) or by section 15-3-570.  We 
disagree. 
In this case, Delaney alleged he was entitled to the statutorily-mandated award for 
a violation of the notice provision pursuant to section 36-9-625(c)(2) due to First 
Financial's insufficient notice of sale.  Section 36-9-625, found in Article 9 of the 
UCC, establishes remedies for a secured party's failure to comply with Article 9, 
providing the following: 
(a) If it is established that a secured party is not 
proceeding in accordance with this chapter, a court may 
order or restrain collection, enforcement, or disposition 
of collateral on appropriate terms and conditions.
* * * 
[c](2) if the collateral is consumer goods, a person that 
was a debtor or a secondary obligor at the time a secured 
party failed to comply with this part may recover for that 
failure in any event an amount not less than the credit 
service charge plus ten percent of the principal amount of 
the obligation or the time-price differential plus ten 
percent of the cash price. 
S.C. Code Ann. § 36-9-625 (2003).  "Article 9 of the U.C.C. does not now nor has 
it ever included a statute of limitations."  Richard H. Nowka, The Secured Party 
Fiddles While the Article 2 Statute of Limitations Clock Ticks-Why the Article 2 
Statute of Limitations Should Not Apply to Deficiency Actions, 7 Fla. St. U. Bus. 
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Rev. 1, 2 n.4 (2008). Thus, Delaney argues the statute of limitations in Article 2 of 
the UCC, section 36-2-725(1) applies, providing six years.  We disagree.   
First, Delaney did not allege a breach of contract.  Rather, Delaney alleged the 
violation of the notice of sale requirements, and his prayer for relief requested the 
statutory penalty of the finance charge and ten percent of the principal amount of 
the obligation under section 36-9-625(c)(2).  Thus, section 36-2-725(1) did not 
apply because it provides as follows: "An action for breach of any contract for sale 
must be commenced within six years after the cause of action has accrued."  S.C. 
Code Ann. § 36-2-725(1) (2003). Because Delaney did not allege a breach of 
contract, we agree section 36-2-725(1) did not apply.  Instead, we look to Title 15 
governing civil remedies.   
Sections 15-3-540 and -570 provide statutes of limitations for actions upon statutes 
for a penalty. See S.C. Code Ann. § 15-3-540(2) (2005) (providing a three-year 
statute of limitations for "[a]n action upon a statute for a penalty or forfeiture"); 
S.C. Code Ann. § 15-3-570 (2005) (establishing a one-year statute of limitations 
for "[a]n action upon a statute for a penalty or forfeiture given, in whole or in part, 
to any person who will prosecute for it must be commenced within one year after 
the commission of the offense").  Like the trial court, we find the controlling 
limitations period is either section 15-3-570 or section 15-3-540(2), respectively 
one or three years, because Delaney sought a statutory penalty.
"As a general principle, the legislature has the authority to provide civil penalties 
to enforce observance of a legislative policy."  S.C. Dep't of Health & Envtl. 
Control v. Kennedy, 289 S.C. 73, 76, 344 S.E.2d 859, 861 (Ct. App. 1986).  A 
statutory penalty is defined as a penalty "an individual is allowed to recover against 
a wrongdoer as satisfaction for wrong or injury suffered, without reference to 
actual damage sustained." Black's Law Dictionary 1412 (6th ed. 1990).  Although 
not addressing the statute of limitations issue, at least three South Carolina 
Supreme Court cases have identified the "damages" in section 36-9-625(c)(2) as a 
statutory penalty. 
Citing the former version of section 36-9-625(c)(2), the supreme court in Crane v. 
Citicorp National Services, Inc., 313 S.C. 70, 72, 437 S.E.2d 50, 51-52 (1993) 
(superseded by statute on other grounds), addressed whether co-obligors, who did 
not have title or right to possession of a mobile home, could recover under the 
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penalty provision of the UCC for the creditor's failure to comply with the notice 
requirements. The court found the Cranes were entitled to notice.  Id. at 74, 437 
S.E.2d at 53. The court continued as follows: 
If the notice provision relates to the obligation, then it 
would seem logical that the penalty provision for breach 
of the notice requirements must also be related to the 
obligation, and therefore, applicable to co-obligators of 
consumer goods security agreements. Additionally, the 
statutory penalty is evidence of the legislature's
recognition that the small amount of compensatory 
damages that may be proven in a consumer goods 
repossession and sale would be insufficient to ensure 
creditor compliance with the Code's provisions.   
Id. at 74-75, 437 S.E.2d at 53. 
In Brockbank v. Best Capital Corp., 341 S.C. 372, 375, 534 S.E.2d 688, 690 
(2000), Brockbank sued Best Capital Corp. after the repossession and sale of his 
mobile home, alleging, among other things, a violation of Article 9's notice 
provision. Best Capital admitted it had not sent notice of the sale, but it argued 
Article 9 did not apply to the parties' agreement because there was not a security 
interest. Id. at 377, 534 S.E.2d at 691. The court found notice was required, and 
stated "[i]f a secured party fails to give the required notice, a debtor may seek to 
recover the statutory penalty under Article 9."  Id. at 385, 534 S.E.2d at 695 
(noting the former version of section 36-9-625(c)(2), section 36-9-507(1), which 
embodies nearly identical language as the current version); id. at 384, 534 S.E.2d 
at 694 (concluding "the outcome in this case is largely dictated by Crane"). 
More recently, in Singleton v. Stokes Motors, Inc., 358 S.C. 369, 373, 595 S.E.2d 
461, 463 (2004), Mr. and Mrs. Singleton filed an action based in part on the UCC, 
claiming Stokes Motors, Inc. failed to notify them of its intent to sell the 
Singletons' repossessed vehicle.  Citing the former version of section 36-9-
625(c)(2), the court in Singleton referred to the statute's "penalty" provision in 
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finding both Singletons were entitled to recover because both were entitled to 
notice. Id. at 378, 595 S.E.2d at 466.4 
We find no merit to Delaney's argument that our supreme court's references to the 
statutory penalty in these cases is the result of "loose language" and "unconsidered 
dictim (sic)" and the court interchangeably used the terms "compensatory 
damages" and "penalty" in its opinions.  Based on the definition of a penalty and 
the cases referring to the mandatory, pre-determined amount of "damages" for 
failure to comply with the notice of sale requirements, we find the remedy Delaney 
sought in section 36-9-625(c)(2) was a penalty, and either section 15-3-570 or 
section 15-3-540(2) applied. 
First Financial sent the notice of sale on May 2, 2008, and sold the vehicle on 
December 15, 2008.  Delaney filed this action in October 2011.  Under section 15-
3-570, providing a one-year statute of limitations, Delaney's action is clearly 
barred. Under section 15-3-540(2), providing a three-year statute of limitations, 
whether the action is barred depends on when the action accrued.       
II. Date of Accrual  
Delaney argues the trial court erred in finding the cause of action accrued when the 
notice of sale was received rather than on the date of the sale of the collateral.  We 
disagree. 
Under the three-year statute of limitations, Delaney's complaint was untimely filed 
unless the accrual date is the date First Financial sold the vehicle rather than the 
date of the notice of sale. However, like the trial court, we need not decide 
whether section 15-3-570 or section 15-3-540(2) applied because we find the 
accrual date is the date the notice of sale was received, and Delaney failed to 
timely serve and file his complaint under either statute of limitations.  
4 The court noted that under the revision of 2001, a secured party's liability under 
section 36-9-625(c)(2) is limited to one penalty "with respect to any one secured 
transaction." Id.
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As to section 15-3-570, the statute specifically provides the action "must be 
commenced within one year after the commission of the offense."  S.C. Code Ann. 
§ 15-3-570 (2005). The offense alleged in this case is insufficient notice of sale.  
As noted by the trial court, "this date . . . coincide[s] with the date on which 
[Delaney] either knew or should have known that a violation had occurred."  
Regarding section 15-3-540(2), the statute is silent as to a date of accrual.  To 
interpret this section for the present case, we must apply the rules of statutory 
construction. "The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and 
effectuate the intent of the legislature." Hawkins v. Bruno Yacht Sales, Inc., 353 
S.C. 31, 39, 577 S.E.2d 202, 207 (2003).  "All rules of statutory construction are 
subservient to the one that the legislative intent must prevail if it reasonably can be 
discovered in the language used, and the language must be construed in the light of 
the intended purpose of the statute."  City of Sumter Police Dep't v. One (1) 1992 
Blue Mazda Truck (VIN # JM2UF1132N0294812), 330 S.C. 371, 375, 498 S.E.2d 
894, 896 (Ct. App. 1998). "Statutes, as a whole, must receive practical, reasonable, 
and fair interpretation, consonant with the purpose, design, and policy of 
lawmakers."  Corbin v. Carlin, 366 S.C. 187, 193, 620 S.E.2d 745, 749 (Ct. App. 
2005) (quoting TNS Mills, Inc. v. S.C. Dep't of Revenue, 331 S.C. 611, 624, 503 
S.E.2d 471, 478 (1998)).
Delaney's complaint alleges violations of the notice required prior to the 
disposition of goods in a consumer goods transaction.  See S.C. Code Ann. § 36-9-
611(b) (2003) (requiring notification prior to disposition of collateral); S.C. Code 
Ann. § 36-9-614 (2003) (providing specific requirements for a notification).  His 
right to recovery for a violation of the required notice arises under section 36-9-
625(c)(2). The cause of action depends on a specific act of non-compliance by the 
creditor. Even under the discovery rule, the date of the notice of sale would be the 
date of discovery of the cause of action for a failure to comply with the UCC 
regarding the notice.  We find the legislature did not intend to impose a different 
date for the statute of limitation to accrue.  See Hodges v. Rainey, 341 S.C. 79, 85, 
533 S.E.2d 578, 581 (2000) ("Under the plain meaning rule, it is not the court's 
place to change the meaning of a clear and unambiguous statute."). 
The dissent maintains section 15-3-540(2)'s three-year statute of limitations did not 
begin to run until First Financial disposed of the collateral in December 2008 
because a secured party must provide reasonable notice of sale only if it disposes 
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of the collateral. According to the dissent, "the only way a secured party can fail to 
comply with section 36-9-611(b) is by failing to give reasonable notice AND 
disposing of the collateral."  Further, the dissent maintains if the secured party 
never disposes of the collateral, it never has to provide notice under section 36-9-
611(b), and if a secured party sends unreasonable notice to a debtor but 
subsequently fails to dispose of the collateral, it has not failed to comply with 
section 36-9-611(b). In support of its position that a secured party must provide 
reasonable notice only if it disposes of the collateral, the dissent cites Official 
Comment eight to section 36-9-611.  Comment eight states, "Nothing in this 
Article prevents a secured party from electing not to conduct a disposition after 
sending a notification. Nor does this Article prevent a secured party from electing 
to send a revised notification if its plans for disposition change."  We respectfully 
disagree with the dissent's interpretation of section 36-9-611(b) and determination 
of the date the three-year statute of limitations began to run.
We believe the statute of limitations begins to run when the secured party sends 
noncompliant notice to the debtor, not when the secured party disposes of the 
collateral. Initially, we note section 36-9-625 provides several remedies for 
noncompliance with the notice requirement.  Among them, the statute provides, 
"[i]f it is established that a secured party is not proceeding in accordance with this 
chapter, a court may order or restrain . . . disposition of collateral on appropriate 
terms and conditions."  §36-9-625(a). It is clear a party must be able to state a 
cause of action in order to request a court restrain disposition of the collateral.  
Therefore, if Delaney could have asked a court to restrain disposition of his 
collateral, his cause of action must have arisen upon his receipt of the 
noncompliant notice.  See Great Games, Inc. v. S.C. Dep't of Revenue, 339 S.C. 79, 
84, 529 S.E.2d 6, 8 (2000) ("Statutes should be construed in light of their intended 
purposes, and in ascertaining the intent of the legislature, a court should not focus 
on any single section or provision but should consider the language of the statute 
as a whole."). 
Further, we believe the Official Comments to section 36-9-611 and 36-9-625(c)(2) 
supports our conclusions. First, Comment two to section 36-9-611 provides, "This 
Section requires a secured party who wishes to dispose of collateral under Section 
9-610 to send 'a reasonable authenticated notification of disposition' to specified 
interested persons, subject to certain exceptions." (emphasis added).  Comment two 
does not state that the secured party must actually dispose of the collateral to be 
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required to send reasonable notification; it simply requires that the secured party 
"wish" to dispose of the collateral.  Based on our reading of Comments two and 
eight to section 36-9-611, we believe after the secured party gives notice, the 
secured party can elect not to dispose of the property; however, if the secured party 
initially wishes to dispose of the property, the secured party must provide
appropriate notice. Therefore, we do not believe that disposition of the collateral is 
a prerequisite to being penalized for failing to give reasonable notice.  
In addition, Official Comment four to the penalty provision, section 36-9-
625(c)(2), states the penalty "is designed to ensure that every noncompliance with 
the requirements of Part 6 [§§ 36-9-601 to -629 (2003 & Supp. 2015)] in a 
consumer-goods transaction results in liability, regardless of any injury that may 
have resulted." Because an injury is not required for a secured party to be liable 
for failing to comply with the notice requirement, the statute of limitations can 
begin to run before the secured party injures the debtor by disposing of the 
collateral in a commercially unreasonable manner.  
Accordingly, we believe section 15-3-540(2)'s three-year statute of limitations 
began to run in May 2008 when Respondent received the notice of sale from First 
Financial. See generally Rashaw v. United Consumers Credit Union, 685 F.3d 
739, 744 (8th Cir. 2012) ("[W]e agree that these claims clearly accrued when 
plaintiffs received the allegedly facially deficient collateral disposition notices."); 
Erdmann v. Rants, 442 N.W.2d 441, 444 (N.D. 1989) (explaining the penalty 
available for failure to comply with the notice of sale requirements exists 
regardless of whether a commercially reasonable sale is held and regardless of 
whether the debtor sustained a loss).
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the order on appeal is 
AFFIRMED.5 
LOCKEMY, C.J., concurs. 
5 We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR. 
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THOMAS, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part:  I concur with the 
majority's conclusion that the statute of limitations found in section 36-2-725(1) of 
the South Carolina Code (2003) does not apply to Appellant's claims.  However, I 
respectfully dissent and would reverse because a three-year statute of limitations 
applies to Appellant's claims and Appellant filed this action within three years of 
the date Respondent disposed of the collateral, which, I believe, is when the statute 
of limitations began to run.   
Under section 15-3-540(2), the statute of limitations is three years for "[a]n action 
upon a statute for a penalty or forfeiture when the action is given to the party 
aggrieved or to such party and the State, except when the statute imposing it 
prescribes a different limitation."  By its plain language, this section's three-year 
statute of limitations applies to actions seeking recovery of a statutory penalty 
when only the aggrieved party can bring the action for the penalty. 
In this case, Appellant brought his action to recover the statutory penalty found in 
section 36-9-625(c)(2) of the South Carolina Code (2003).  This section allows 
only the "debtor or a secondary obligor at the time a secured party failed to 
comply" to recover the statutory penalty.  Thus, Appellant was the only person 
who could have brought an action to recover the statutory penalty because he was 
the debtor at the time Respondent allegedly failed to provide reasonable notice of 
disposition of the collateral. Because Appellant, as the aggrieved party, was the 
only person who could have brought the action, section 15-3-540(2) provided the 
applicable statute of limitations.  Accordingly, the statute of limitations for 
Appellant's action was three years. 
Finding the applicable statute of limitations was three years, we must next consider 
when the statute began to run.  I respectfully disagree with the majority's finding 
that the statute of limitations began to run when Respondent sent the allegedly 
unreasonable notice in May 2008. 
Section 36-9-625(c)(2) provides "a person that was a debtor or a secondary obligor 
at the time a secured party failed to comply with this part may recover" a statutory 
penalty for the failure to comply.  The debtor can recover this penalty only if the 
secured party fails to comply.  Under section 36-9-611(b) of the South Carolina 
Code (2003), "a secured party that disposes of collateral under [s]ection 36-9-610 
shall send to the persons specified in subsection (c) a reasonable authenticated 
notification of disposition." Appellant's claim is that Respondent failed to comply 
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with the notice requirement and, thus, Appellant is entitled to recover the statutory 
penalty found in section 36-9-625(c)(2) because of that failure to comply.   
In my view, based on the plain language of section 36-9-611(b), the only way a 
secured party can fail to comply with section 36-9-611(b) is by failing to give 
reasonable notice AND disposing of the collateral.  Section 36-9-611(b) requires "a 
secured party that disposes of collateral" to provide reasonable notice. (emphasis 
added). Based on this plain language, a secured party must provide reasonable 
notice only if it disposes of the collateral.  If the secured party never disposes of 
the collateral, it never has to provide notice under section 36-9-611(b).  Thus, if a 
secured party sends an unreasonable notice to a debtor but subsequently fails, for 
whatever reason, to dispose of the collateral, it has not failed to comply with 
section 36-9-611(b). And the debtor who receives an unreasonable notice cannot 
bring an action to recover the statutory penalty if the secured party never disposed 
of the collateral because the statutory penalty is authorized only if the secured 
party failed to comply with section 36-9-611(b).  As noted above, the secured party 
has not failed to comply with section 36-9-611(b) unless and until it disposes of the 
collateral. 
This conclusion is supported by the official comments to section 36-9-611.  
Comment eight states, "Nothing in this Article prevents a secured party from 
electing not to conduct a disposition after sending a notification.  Nor does this 
Article prevent a secured party from electing to send a revised notification if its 
plans for disposition change."  Thus, this comment contemplates that a secured 
party may send a revised notification in order to comply with the notice 
requirement in section 36-9-611(b).  If a secured party sent an unreasonable notice 
to a debtor and subsequently, but prior to disposition, sent a reasonable second 
notice, the secured party would be in compliance with section 36-9-611, and the 
debtor would not have an action to recover the statutory penalty based on a failure 
to comply.  Additionally, comment eight contemplates that a secured party may 
send a notification and later decide not to dispose of the collateral in which case 
the secured party would not have failed to comply with section 36-9-611(b), and 
the debtor could not recover the statutory penalty under section 36-9-625(c)(2).  
This conclusion is further supported by examination of the purpose underlying the 
notice requirement, which is, in part, to allow the debtor to see that the sale is 
conducted in a commercially reasonable manner.  See Brockbank v. Best Capital 
Corp., 341 S.C. 372, 384, 534 S.E.2d 688, 695 (2000) ("The purpose of the notice 
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is to allow the debtor to discharge the debt and redeem the collateral, produce 
another purchaser, or see that the sale is conducted in a commercially reasonable 
manner."). If the secured party initially sends an unreasonable notice and 
subsequently sends a reasonable second notice, the purpose of the notice 
requirement is accomplished because the debtor received a reasonable notice and 
can see the sale is conducted in a commercially reasonable manner.  Therefore, the 
purpose underlying the notice requirement supports the conclusion that the secured 
party has not failed to comply with section 36-9-611(b) unless and until it disposes
of the collateral. 
Furthermore, this conclusion is supported by examination of the purpose
underlying the statutory penalty.  The penalty is necessary to motivate secured 
parties to comply with the code's provisions.  See id. at 385, 534 S.E.2d at 695 
("The statutory penalty is evidence of the legislature's recognition that the small 
amount of compensatory damages that may be proven in a consumer goods 
repossession and sale would be insufficient to ensure creditor compliance with the 
[c]ode's provisions." (brackets removed)).  If the secured party initially sends an 
unreasonable notice and subsequently sends a reasonable second notice, imposing 
the statutory penalty based on the initial unreasonable notice would not serve the 
penalty's purpose because the secured party would have ultimately complied with 
the notice requirement. 
The majority contends Appellant's cause of action "must have arisen upon his 
receipt" of the unreasonable notice because section 36-9-625(a) allows a party to 
request the circuit court to restrain disposition of the collateral, presumably 
through an injunction, if the "secured party is not proceeding in accordance with 
this chapter." Because section 36-9-625(c)(2) is a statutory penalty, it is available 
only in the specific circumstances prescribed by the statute.  See State ex rel. 
Callison v. Nat'l Linen Serv. Corp., 225 S.C. 232, 234, 81 S.E.2d 342, 343 (1954) 
("The prime rule requires strict construction of a statutory provision which would 
work a forfeiture or inflict a penalty."); King v. Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co., 86 S.C. 
510, 513, 68 S.E. 769, 770 (1910) (noting a statutory penalty "is the creature of the 
statute, and comes into existence when all statutory conditions exist, and not 
otherwise"). As discussed above, the penalty in section 36-9-625(c)(2) is available 
only when a secured party fails to comply.  Alternatively, the statute providing for 
the possibility of an injunction does not require a failure to comply; rather an 
injunction is available at any time a secured party is not proceeding in accordance 
with Article Nine. Because the legislature used different language in sections 36-
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9-625(a) and 36-9-625(c)(2) to express when each remedy is available to a debtor, 
we must assume the legislature intended to draw a distinction between the two 
remedies.  See Gordon v. Phillips Utils., Inc., 362 S.C. 403, 406, 608 S.E.2d 425, 
427 (2005) ("[T]he legislature intends to accomplish something by its choice of 
words, and would not do a futile thing.").   
Thus, the monetary penalty in section 36-9-625(c)(2) and the injunction in section 
36-9-625(a) have different thresholds for applicability, and they are not necessarily 
available to a debtor at the same time.  As a result, even if we assume, due to the 
possibility of an injunction, a cause of action or right arises when a secured party 
sends an unreasonable notice, such an assumption does not lead automatically to 
the conclusion, as found by the majority, that the monetary penalty is also available 
when a secured party sends an unreasonable notice. 
Accordingly, I would find a debtor does not have a cause of action to recover the 
statutory penalty based on a secured party failing to provide reasonable notice as 
required by section 36-9-611(b) until the secured party disposes of the collateral.  
As a result, the statute of limitations would not begin to run until the secured party 
disposes of the collateral. See Walsh v. Woods, 358 S.C. 259, 264, 594 S.E.2d 548, 
551 (Ct. App. 2004) ("In analyzing a limitations defense, the fundamental test for 
determining whether a cause of action has accrued is whether the party asserting 
the claim can maintain an action to enforce it.  Thus, a particular cause of action 
accrues at the moment when the plaintiff has a legal right to sue on it." (citations 
and internal quotation marks omitted) (brackets removed)).
Here, Respondent could not have failed to comply with section 36-9-611(b) until it 
disposed of the collateral without providing reasonable notice, and Appellant could 
not have brought an action to recover the statutory penalty based on a failure to 
comply until Respondent disposed of the collateral.  Thus, the statute of limitations 
began to run in December 2008 when Respondent disposed of the collateral.  
Appellant filed this action in October 2011, which was within the applicable three-
year statute of limitations, and I would find the circuit court erred by dismissing 
Appellant's complaint. 
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LOCKEMY, C.J.: The State appeals the circuit court's dismissal of its case 
against Steven Hoss Walters, Jr. for driving under the influence (DUI), second 
offense. The State argues the circuit court erred in finding (1) the video recording 
of the incident site failed to comply with the requirements of section 56-5-2953(A) 
of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2015) and (2) section 56-5-2953(B) of the 
South Carolina Code (Supp. 2015) was not applicable.  We reverse and remand. 
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FACTS/PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
On July 13, 2014, Walters was arrested for DUI in York County. On that date, 
Trooper Mike McAdams, the arresting officer, administered a horizontal gaze 
nystagmus (HGN) test. While his dashboard camera was recording, Trooper 
McAdams positioned Walters in front of his patrol car facing away from the 
camera and conducted the test. According to Trooper McAdams, Walters was 
turned away from the patrol car to prevent the flashing lights from causing a false 
positive on the HGN test. 
On December 16, 2014, this case proceeded to trial in the circuit court.  During a 
pretrial hearing, the circuit court dismissed the case, finding the video recording 
did not comply with section 56-5-2953(A) of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 
2015) because it did not fully show the administration of the HGN test.  The court 
found because Walters was facing away from the camera, it could not determine 
whether Trooper McAdams and Walters were in the proper position or whether 
Trooper McAdams was moving his finger at the proper pace.  The circuit court 
further held section 56-5-2953(B) of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2015) did not 
apply because the video recording was not missing or malfunctioning.  This appeal 
followed. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW
"In criminal cases, the appellate court sits to review errors of law only."  State v. 
Baccus, 367 S.C. 41, 48, 625 S.E.2d 216, 220 (2006).  Therefore, this court is 
bound by the trial court's factual findings unless the appellant can demonstrate that 
the trial court's conclusions either lack evidentiary support or are controlled by an 
error of law. State v. Laney, 367 S.C. 639, 643-44, 627 S.E.2d 726, 729 (2006). 
LAW/ANALYSIS 
I. Section 56-5-2953(A) 
The State argues the circuit court erred in dismissing its case against Walters 
because the video recording did not comply with section 56-5-2953(A) of the 
South Carolina Code. We agree.   
Pursuant to section 56-5-2953,  
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(A) A person who violates Section 56-5-2930, 56-5-
2933, or 56-5-2945 must have his conduct at the incident 
site and the breath test site video recorded. 
 
(1)(a) The video recording at the incident site must: 
 
(i) not begin later than the activation of the 
officer's blue lights; 
 
(ii) include any field sobriety tests administered; 
and 
 
(iii) include the arrest of a person for a violation of 
Section 56-5-2930 or Section 56-5-2933, or a 
probable cause determination in that the person 
violated Section 56-5-2945, and show the person 
being advised of his Miranda rights. 
 
S.C. Code Ann. § 56-5-2953(A) (Supp. 2015).   
 
The State asserts the video recording in this case complied with the statute because 
it began before Walters was stopped and continued uninterrupted during the 
administration of the field sobriety tests, the reading of Miranda,1 and Walters' 
arrest. The State contends the statute does not require every aspect of the HGN 
test be seen in order to judge a person's performance or the officer's administration 
of the test. The State maintains the plain language of the statute does not require 
the officer's hand to be visible at all times during the administration of the HGN 
test, nor does it require the video to provide the viewer with the ability to assess the 
defendant's success or failure. The State argues as long as the recording includes 
"any field sobriety tests administered," it is in compliance with the plain, 
unambiguous language of the statute.   
 
Walters contends he and Trooper McAdams were positioned in such a manner 
during the HGN test that it could not be determined whether the test was properly 
administered.  Walters notes that prior to 2009, section 56-5-2953(A) only required 
the defendant's conduct be recorded at the incident site.  See S.C. Code Ann § 56-
5-2953(A) (2006).  In 2009, the legislature amended the statute, expressly 
requiring the recording of field sobriety tests.  See S.C. Code Ann. § 56-5-
                                                            
1  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (1966).   
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2953(A)(1)(a)(ii) (Supp. 2015). Walters asserts that had the legislature intended 
there only be a recording of field sobriety tests, without the ability to determine the 
defendant's performance on the tests, there would have been no need to amend the 
statute. 
Recently, in State v. Gordon, 414 S.C. 94, 777 S.E.2d 376 (2015), our supreme 
court addressed HGN tests and the recording requirements found in section 56-5-
2953(A). The Gordon court affirmed this court's holding section 56-5-2953(A) 
requires a motorist's head be recorded during an HGN test.  414 S.C. at 96, 777 
S.E.2d at 377. The supreme court held section 56-5-2953(A) is clear and 
unambiguous and its provision that video recordings must include any field 
sobriety test administered, necessarily includes the HGN test. 414 S.C. at 99, 777 
S.E.2d at 378. The court noted because the HGN test focuses on eye movement, 
"common sense dictates that the head must be visible on the video."  Id.  Despite 
Gordon's assertion he was out of sight and in the dark during the HGN test, the 
court found the requirement the head be visible on the video was met and the 
statutory requirement that the administration of the HGN field sobriety test be 
video recorded was satisfied.  Id. at 99-100, 777 S.E.2d at 379. The court noted 
the officer's administration of the HGN test was visible on the video recording; 
Gordon's face was depicted in the video ("it is axiomatic that the face is a part of 
the head"); the officer's flashlight and arm were visible during the administration of 
the test; and the officer's instructions were audible.  Id.
We find the video recording at issue in the present case properly included the 
recording of any field sobriety tests administered as required by section 56-5-
2953(A). Walters's head is visible during the entire recording of the HGN test.  In 
addition, Trooper McAdams's arm is visible as he administers the test, and his 
instructions are audible. While Trooper McAdams's finger disappears at times 
during the test as his hand moves in front of Walters's face, the statute does not 
require video recordings of the HGN test include views of all angles of the test.  
Such a requirement would be unreasonable given the limitations of dashboard 
cameras.  Accordingly, we reverse the circuit court's dismissal of the case.   
II. Section 56-5-2953(B) 
The State argues the circuit court erred in finding section 56-5-2953(B) of the 
South Carolina Code was not applicable.  In light of our decision to reverse the 
circuit court as to the first issue on appeal, we need not address this issue.  See
Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 
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591, 598 (1999) (holding an appellate court need not address remaining issues 
when disposition of a prior issue is dispositive).   
CONCLUSION 
The circuit court's decision is 
REVERSED AND REMANDED. 
KONDUROS and MCDONALD, JJ., concur. 
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LOCKEMY, C.J.:  In this dispute arising out of a construction project, Rose 
Electric, Inc. (Rose Electric) appeals the trial court's order finding for Southern 
Produce, Inc. (Southern) and S2P, LLC, (S2P) (collectively Respondents) arguing 
the trial court erred in (1) finding an expressed contract barred its recovery under 
the theory of quantum meruit; (2) finding Rose Electric did not establish the 
elements of its quantum meruit claim; (3) and failing to award Rose Electric 
damages.   
FACTS 
Southern is in the business of processing produce for sale.  In the fall of 2010, 
Southern leased a parcel of land from S2P in the new South Carolina Farmers 
Market in Lexington County.  On October 27, 2010, Southern entered into a "flat 
fee, turnkey contract" with Cooler Erectors of Atlanta (Cooler Erectors) to 
construct a refrigerated processing center on the property.   
During the first week of November 2010, Morris Teasley, the president of Cooler 
Erectors, contacted Homer Rose, the owner of Rose Electric, about subcontracting 
the electrical work on the Southern project.  Cooler Erectors and Rose Electric 
worked on three other projects at the new Farmers Market prior to working on the 
Southern project. Rose Electric agreed to complete the work; however, Rose 
Electric and Cooler Erectors did not discuss a price for the Southern project.   
During the project Southern asked Rose Electric to modify the plans and materials 
Rose Electric received from Cooler Erectors.  Rose Electric agreed to make those 
changes. 
Throughout the construction process, Southern paid Cooler Erectors $203,277.00 
of the project's $213,385.00 contract price.  However, Cooler Erectors did not pay 
Rose Electric.  Eventually, Rose Electric filed a mechanics' lien on Southern's
property. The statement of account attached to the mechanics lien claimed Rose 
Electric was owed $54,339.13 for the "Total Contract Price" and $10,755.39 for 
"Change Orders." 
On May 20, 2011, Rose Electric filed its complaint alleging causes of action for 
foreclosure of its mechanics' lien, breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and 
quantum meruit.  During opening statements, Rose Electric notified the trial court 
it would only be pursuing its equitable cause of action for quantum meruit.   
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The trial court issued its order finding for Respondents on January 30, 2014. The 
trial court found an expressed contract existed between Rose Electric and Southern 
for the change orders and between Rose Electric and Cooler Erectors for the 
original scope of work. The trial court recognized Rose Electric elected not to 
proceed on its contract claims; therefore, the trial court found for Respondents.  
The trial court found the existence of an expressed contract precluded Rose 
Electric from recovery under quantum meruit.  In the alternative, the trial court 
found Rose Electric failed to establish the elements of quantum meruit because 
Southern paid all but $10,108.00 of the contract price to Cooler Erectors and 
offered to pay Rose Electric for the change orders and a prorated share of the 
retainage. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Quantum meruit is an equitable doctrine to allow recovery for unjust enrichment.  
Columbia Wholesale Co., Inc. v. Scudder May N.V., 312 S.C. 259, 261, 440 S.E.2d 
129, 130 (1994). "When reviewing an action in equity, an appellate court reviews 
the evidence to determine facts in accordance with its own view of the 
preponderance of the evidence."  Boykin Contracting, Inc. v. Kirby, 405 S.C. 631, 
637, 748 S.E.2d 795, 798 (Ct. App. 2013). 
LAW/ANALYSIS 
a) Existence of a Contract 
Rose Electric argues the trial court erred in finding an express contract between 
Rose Electric and Cooler Erectors for the scope of work under the original plans 
and between Rose Electric and Southern for the change orders because there was 
no assent to the price term of either agreement.  We agree. 
"A contract is an obligation which arises from actual agreement of the parties 
manifested by words, oral or written, or by conduct."  Stanley Smith & Sons v. 
Limestone College, 283 S.C. 430, 433, 322 S.E.2d 474, 477 (Ct. App. 1984).  "If 
agreement is manifested by words, the contract is said to be express."  Id; see also 
13 Am. Jur. 2d Building & Constr. Contracts § 5 (2009) ("Where the parties to a 
building contract have orally agreed to the terms of performance and the price, 
there is an express contract." (emphasis added)).  "If [the contract] is manifested by 
conduct, it is said to be implied."  Stanley Smith & Sons, 283 S.C. at 434, 322 
S.E.2d at 477. 
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"Certain terms, such as price, time and place, are considered indispensable and 
must be set out with reasonable certainty."  McPeters v. Yeargin Const. Co., Inc., 
290 S.C. 327, 331, 350 S.E.2d 208, 211 (Ct. App. 1986); see also Stanley Smith & 
Sons, 283 S.C. at 434, 322 S.E.2d at 477 (noting price is an essential term in a 
construction contract). Even if the parties intend to be bound by an agreement, the 
absence of material terms renders the agreement unenforceable. Stevens & 
Wilkinson of S.C., Inc. v. City of Columbia, 409 S.C. 568, 579, 762 S.E.2d 696, 
701 (2014). 
We find the trial court erred in finding an express contract between Rose Electric 
and Cooler Erectors and Rose Electric and Southern.  The evidence presented 
showed each of the three parties intended to be bound to their agreements.  Rose 
Electric began working prior to signing an agreement and Homer Rose testified, 
"We had previously done work for Cooler Erectors of Atlanta.  We had completed 
three jobs, all of which we had been paid well.  We had been paid on demand."   
However, Rose acknowledged Rose Electric did not have a written contract with 
Cooler Erectors, nor had the two parties agreed to a contract price.  Rather, Rose 
Electric sent Cooler Erectors invoices based on the time and cost of materials used.  
No evidence was presented to support the trial court's finding that Rose Electric 
and Cooler Erectors manifested an agreement on the price of the electrical work 
required on the Southern project, which our courts require as an essential term in 
construction contracts.  See Stanley Smith & Sons, 283 S.C. at 434, 322 S.E.2d at 
477 (noting price is an essential term in a construction contract); McPeters, 290 
S.C. at 331, 350 S.E.2d at 211 ("Certain terms, such as price, time and place, are 
considered indispensable and must be set out with reasonable certainty.").  
Therefore, the trial court erred in finding an express contract between Cooler 
Erectors and Rose Electric. 
We also find the trial court erred in finding an express contract between Rose 
Electric and Southern.  At several points during the construction, Dan Stocker, the 
general manager of Southern, requested Rose Electric modify the electrical plans 
to better accommodate Southern's anticipated uses.  Specifically Southern 
requested Rose Electric include stainless steel disconnects rather than hard wiring 
in certain equipment, add a hand washer and water heater circuit, relocate an onion 
peeler station outside the building, install additional receptacles, and add additional 
lighting. According to Rose, Southern took responsibility for paying for these 
changes. However, the parties did not agree on the cost of those changes or the 
method by which those charges would be determined.  In this case, the lack of a 
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price term is fatal to the existence of an express contract and the trial court erred in 
finding an express contract existed. 
We acknowledge Rose Electric worked with Cooler Erectors on other projects at 
the new farmers market, and had been paid without signing a contract.  Rose 
Electric also provided Cooler Erectors with a "proposal" after construction was 
complete detailing the amount of work Rose Electric completed.  We also
acknowledge Southern requested Rose Electric make certain changes to the 
electrical plans and accepted responsibility for any additional charges.  This 
evidence supports the inference that Rose Electric, Southern, and Cooler Erectors 
intended to be bound by their agreements; however, the missing price term is fatal 
to finding an express contract where, as here, the parties are contemplating a 
construction project.  See Stevens & Wilkinson of S.C., Inc., 409 S.C. at 579, 762 
S.E.2d at 701 (2014) (finding no contract existed though the parties intended to be 
bound by an agreement because the absence of material terms rendered the 
agreement unenforceable); McPeters, 290 S.C. at 331, 350 S.E.2d at 211 ("Certain 
terms, such as price, time and place, are considered indispensable and must be set 
out with reasonable certainty."); Stanley Smith & Sons, 283 S.C. at 434, 322 S.E.2d 
at 477 (noting price is an essential term in a construction contract).   
b) Quantum Meruit 
Rose Electric also argues the trial court erred in finding it could not recover under 
quantum meruit because it did not prove Southern unjustly retained a benefit 
without paying for its value.  We agree. 
"[Q]uantum meruit, quasi-contract, and implied by law contract are equivalent 
terms for an equitable remedy."  Myrtle Beach Hosp., Inc. v. City of Myrtle Beach, 
341 S.C. 1, 8, 532 S.E.2d 868, 872 (2000).  In order to recover under the theory of 
quantum meruit, a plaintiff must prove: "1) a benefit conferred by the plaintiff 
upon the defendant; 2) realization of that benefit by the defendant; and 3) retention 
of the benefit by the defendant under circumstances that make it inequitable for 
him to retain it without paying its value."  Swanson v. Stratos, 350 S.C. 116, 121, 
564 S.E.2d 117, 119 (Ct. App. 2002). 
"Courts addressing a claim of unjust enrichment by a subcontractor against a 
property owner have typically denied recovery when the owner in fact paid on its 
contract with the general contractor." Williams Carpet Contractors, 400 S.C. at 
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326, 734 S.E.2d at 180 (quoting Columbia Wholesale Co., 312 S.C. at 262-63, 440 
S.E.2d at 131)). 
Southern paid $203,277.00 to Cooler Erectors pursuant to its October 22, 2010 
contract. The total contract price for the building was $213,385.00.1  Southern 
retained $10,103 from the contract price because "the work contained within the 
scope of the contract had not been completed."  On December 2 the walls were not 
painted, the doors were not painted, automatic door closers were not installed, and 
there were draining issues. However, Rose Electric's work had been completed.   
The trial court found Southern paid over 95% of the contract price to Cooler 
Erectors and "ha[d] consistently stood ready to pay the prorated shares of the 
retainage." We agree with the trial court that it would be unjust to require 
Southern pay the entire $54,339.13 owed to Rose Electric by Cooler Erectors.   
Southern did withhold $10,103 from the purchase price.  This was a benefit that 
Southern retained from the work performed by Rose Electric Southern did not pay 
for. 
We find Southern's offer to pay Rose Electric a prorated share of the retainage 
creates a sufficient equitable remedy.  A subcontractor that is owed a debt for labor 
or materials furnished and used in the erection of a building has a lien upon the 
building and the land to secure the payment due.  S.C. Code Ann. § 29-5-10 
(2007). "However, in no event shall the aggregate amount of any liens on the 
improvement exceed the amount due by the owner."  S.C. Code Ann. § 29-5-20 
(2007). "In the event the amount due the contractor by the owner is insufficient to 
pay all the lienors acquiring liens as herein provided it is the duty of the owner to 
1 Rose Electric challenges the trial court's finding that the total cost of the project 
was $213,385.00, and that the architectural plans were included in the total project 
price. We recognize in an action in equity, this court may find the facts based on 
our own view of the preponderance of the evidence.  First Nat'l Bank of S.C. v. 
Soden, 333 S.C. 554, 567, 511 S.E.2d 372, 379 (Ct. App. 1998).  "However, we are 
not required to disregard the findings of the trial [court] who saw and heard the 
witnesses and was in a better position to judge their credibility." Id.  Evidence 
supported both Rose Electric and Southern's respective position.  We find the issue 
of whether the architectural plans were intended to be part of the contract price was
an issue of credibility. Accordingly, we adopt the trial court's finding that the total 
contract price of the project included the architectural plans.
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prorate among all just claims the amount due the contractor."  S.C. Code Ann. §29-
5-60(A) (2007).
Of the $213,385.00 total price of the project, Southern paid Cooler Erectors 
$203,277.00. Southern retained $10,103 because "the work contained within the 
scope of the contract had not been completed."  When Cooler Erectors abandoned 
the job site, two other sub-contractors filed mechanic's liens on the property to 
secure payment. Rose Electric's lien claimed it was owed $54,339.13 on the 
construction agreement, a concrete supplier claimed a lien of $14,528.20, and a 
plumber claimed a lien of $10,210.93. The three subcontractors' claims totaled 
$79,139.26. 
Had Rose Electric proceeded with its mechanics' lien foreclosure action, it's 
recovery would have been limited to 68.74% of the retainage, totaling $6,948.24. 
However, Rose Electric abandoned its mechanics' lien cause of action prior to trial 
and proceeded only on it quantum meruit cause of action.  While Rose Electric did 
not invoke the mechanics' lien statute as a theory for recovery, we find the statute 
provides a framework for determining what recovery is proper in quantum meruit 
cases involving construction contracts.  Where, as here, a building owner has paid 
a general contractor a substantial amount of the contract price, we find the 
mechanics lien statutes, and their limitations, are a proper measure of the 
subcontractor's damages against the property owner in a quantum meruit action. 
Furthermore, the mechanics' lien statutes do not distinguish between liens that 
settle prior to trial and those that continue to trial.  Rather, "it is the duty of the 
owner to prorate among all just claims the amount due the contractor." § 29-5-
60(A). Southern did that in this case.  We find the trial court properly included all 
liens filed against Southern when considering the amount of the retainage to which 
Rose Electric was entitled. 2 
2 Rose Electric argues Southern should not be able to use their payments to Cooler 
Erectors as a defense to Rose Electric's quantum meruit claim because Cooler 
Erectors was not a licensed general contractor in South Carolina.  We disagree that
Cooler Erector's status as an unlicensed general contractor prohibits Southern from
relying on its payments to Cooler Erectors as a defense in this case.  Section 40-11-
370 of the South Carolina Code (2011) prohibits unlicensed contractors, like 
Cooler Erectors, from attempting to enforce a contract they entered into.  That 
statute does not prohibit individuals who contract with unlicensed general 
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A defendant is not relieved of its responsibility to pay for a benefit because the 
defendant offered to pay prior to trial.  Here, Southern has retained $10,103 of the 
contract price, but has recognized the full benefit of Rose Electric's services.  The 
trial court erred in finding Rose Electric could not prove Southern retained a 
benefit without paying for it to the extent of the retainage.  Accordingly we reverse 
and direct the trial court to enter judgment for Rose Electric for $6,948.24–the 
amount of its prorated share of the retainage. 
We also reverse the trial court's order denying Rose Electric recovery for the 
change orders. As previously noted, no express contract between Rose Electric 
and Southern existed in this case.  The court's only discussion of the quantum
meruit action based on the change orders was "Southern Produce has offered to pay 
Rose [Electric] $10,755.39 for the change orders per its verbal contract."  Based on 
Southern's offer to pay for the change orders, the trial court found Rose Electric 
failed to prove Southern retained a benefit under conditions that make it unjust for 
it to retain the benefit without paying its value.  As discussed previously, there is 
no authority to support the assertion that a defendant is relieved of its responsibility 
to pay for a benefit because the defendant offered to pay prior to trial.  Rose 
Electric modified the electrical plans to better suit Southern's work process; 
Southern has realized the benefit of Rose Electric's services; and Southern has not 
paid for those services. See Swanson, 350 S.C. at 121, 564 S.E.2d at 119 (noting 
the elements of quantum meruit are: "1) a benefit conferred by the plaintiff upon 
the defendant; 2) realization of that benefit by the defendant; and 3) retention of 
the benefit by the defendant under circumstances that make it inequitable for him
to retain it without paying its value").  We find Rose Electric is entitled to be paid 
the stipulated price for its work and remand to the trial court to enter judgment in 
the amount of $10,755.39 for those services. 
We reverse and remand to the trial court to modify its judgment to include an 
award of damages to Rose Electric in the amount of $17,703.63 and to address 
Rose Electric's claim for prejudgment interest.   
contractors from alleging payment to those contractors as a defense to claims by 
subcontractors. We affirm the trial court's determination that Cooler Erector's
status as an unlicensed general contractor is irrelevant to this case. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the trial court is 
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
WILLIAMS and MCDONALD, JJ., concur. 
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